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Foreword 
The 75th anniversary of the founding of the New Zealand Labour Party 
occurred in 1991. Needless to say the party itself was not in a notably 
celebratory mood, having just suffered a huge electoral defeat and all 
that that entailed in tettns of after-the-event recriminations and soul-
searching. However as academics we thought the occasion should be 
marked and pondered. After all there are not many local organisations 
which have persisted for half the length of our constitutional history, let 
alone one that is so full of impassioned, ideals-driven, argumentative 
people as the Labour Party. 
The following papers were presented at a day-long seminar held in 
the Stout Research Centre on 29 October 1991. Contributors contem-
plated not only the Labour Party's past triumphs and disasters, but also 
its future political and policy options. Party activists and officials 
present were as frank as more detached observers in acknowledging the 
Party's internal difficulties and contradictions, and the need to define 
a fresh vision for itself. The discussion was lively and good-natured, 
but alas our efforts to record it for transcription failed. It must remain 
only a pleasant memory for participants. 
From the papers you will see that although problems were recognised 
few prescriptions for change were profferred. The Labour Party itself 
must go through the laborious process of putting its house in order and 
fashioning a new consensus with which to inspire enthusiasm in the 
voters. To function effectively our system needs coherent and confident 
political parties capable of evoking commitment from thoughtful 
citizens. 
We wish to thank those who contributed such interesting and 
provocative papers to the seminar, and the Stout Research Centre for 
their hospitality. 
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Margaret Clark 
Department of Politics 
Victoria University of Wellington 
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or Coming Home? The Labour Party in 
w 
1916 and 1991 Compared 
Barry Gustajso11 
In his novel Children of the Poor, 1 John A. Lee's main character, 
Albany Porcello, returns as a man to Riversdale, a wonderful, magical 
place as perceived through the nostalgia of his childhood memories. 
Albany trembled with anticipation as he remembered that home. It was 
). a world 'of majestic sunsets ... of the quivering music of insects .. .in the 
f heat of midday ... of feathered songster that throbbed an evening chorus ... 
The world was wide and full of thrills in the daytime'. He was coming 
home. 
The New Zealand Labour Party is 75 years old. It was established, 
after twelve years of debate and conflict, at a conference in Wellington 
on 7 July 1916 and since that time has enjoyed a turbulent but 
honourable history. After 75 years one would expect considerable 
changes both in the party itself and in the political, economic, social 
and cultural environments of which it is an inextricable part. Some have 
suggested that the changes have been too great and altered the essence 
of the party's identity. Since the devastating defeat of the fourth Labour 
Government in October 1990, a recurrent theme in Mike Moore's 
speeches has been the suggestion that, after straying far afield, Labour 
should 'come home'; that Labour should return to its roots, reject as did 
the prodigal son an alien lifestyle and fairweather friends, and embrace 
once again its own family and the values of its early life. 
Moore's theme of 'coming home', however, raises more questions 
than it answers. Home to what? Was home a place, a people, a social 
group or whanau, a set of shared beliefs? How does one get there? 
Does it still exist? Should one try? What would one find when one got 
there? Is it still possible to make such a pilgrimage? Was it really a 
happy, united family home or a house of many rooms inhabited by 
people who disagreed with and never really liked each other? Does one 
1 
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have a number of homes over a period of 75 years and which one if 
any should one return to? Is home in fact not a place but where one's 
heart is? 
To try to answer such questions it is necessary to summarise briefly 
the history of the Labour Party from its foundation in 1916 to the 
present day. An Italian political scientist, Angelo Panebianco,2 has 
argued that 'a party's organizational characteristics depend more on 
how the organization originated and how it consolidated than upon any 
other factor'. The New Zealand Labour Party's genetic model embodied 
the values, perceptions, goals and organizational processes of the 
party's major sponsor, the trade union moven1ent. It should never be 
forgotten when trying to understand the Labour Party that it was created 
by and on an existing substratum of organised social units, the trade 
unions, for the explicit purpose of putting more manual workers into 
parliament to represent and pass legislation in the interests of the class 
of which they were not only representatives but also members. 
Members of Parliament would govern not just paternally in the interests 
of the working class but would speak and act with experience because 
they themselves were workers. The Labour Party was the political voice 
and artn of the trade union movement and many trade unionists gave 
their primary loyalty to the union and only their secondary, indirect 
loyalty to a Labour Party which, from the first, many saw as being 
dominated by opportunists, con1promisers and careerists. 
From its inception, however, Labour had a dual nature. It was also 
a social democratic party. Woven into the party's fabric during its 
formative years were other sections of society who felt, and indeed 
were, alienated from the mainstream of New Zealand society and 
politics; women wanting equality with men or independence from the 
male patriarchy; the Maori, particularly the poor and those who did not 
enjoy rangatira status; conscientious objectors, pacifists and anti-
imperialists; monetary reformers; Christians with a social conscience; 
secular humanitarians; Marxists of various persuasions; people seeking 
jobs, hotnes, pensions, health services and education for themselves, 
their families and others; those envious of the advantages others had; 
and those who simply detested the Refortn Governments ~of Massey and 
Coates and what those politicians personified. 
Although never as united in composition or objectives as later 
mythology suggested, the Labour Party at first did share a common set 
of beliefs which gave it a collective identity and solidarity. Labour was 
not just concerned with its survival as an organisation or with political 
power for its own sake. Labouris1n was and is not synonymous with 
soc~alism but b?~h stress a sense of corporate identity economically, 
socially and pohttcally and both seek to protect and improve the lot of 
• 
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the less affluent and less powerful in society. It is no accident that in 
the 1930s the Labour Party translated into Maori became Roupu 
Rawakore (Party of the Poor) and Ngati Kai Mahi (Party of Food for 
the Workers). 
Freedom from poverty, unemployment, oppression, exploitation and 
alienation were the common objectives most people in the Labour Party 
believed in for most of the party's 75 year history. While recognising 
the antagonism and conflict inherent between corporate class interests, 
most of those in the Labour Party also sought harmony in society and 
argued that state intervention was both essential and desirable if those 
divisions were to be minimised and society kept stable. If the two 
specific interrelated things Labour hated most - unemployment and 
poverty - were to be at the very least minimised and hopefully fully 
removed, governments would have to legislate, arbitrate and regulate to 
build and maintain a healthy economy and a welfare state in which, to 
use Michael Joseph Savage's words, people would be 'secure against 
poverty, secure in illness or old age'. Labour believed that capitalism 
could be humanised and legitimised by the creation of the welfare state 
and the fostering of equality of opportunity, especially through 
education. 
Labour's intellectual heritage derived only indirectly and peripherally 
from Marx. Much more of Labour's social justice agenda reflected the 
ideals and the rhetoric of Old Testament prophets such as Isaiah and 
Amos and the concern Jesus Christ showed for the poor, the dispos-
sessed, the powerless and the alienated. The Americans Henry George 
and Edward Bellamy contributed to the anti-speculation and cooperative 
elements embedded in Labour's outlook. A range of writers - John 
Atkinson Hobson, John Maynard Keynes, Irving Fisher, Frederick 
Soddy, and Clifford Hugh Douglas, for example -convinced Labour's 
early leaders that poverty amidst plenty was a ridiculous obscenity 
caused by underconsumption and a maldistribution of purchasing 
power. A growth in demand was necessary to generate a growth in 
consumption and further production, encouraging investment, creating 
employment, further -increasing demand and providing the tax base 
sufficient to maintain a welfare system on which there was diminishing 
instead of escalating pressure. A partial redistribution of wealth through 
graduated income taxation and the welfare system, combined with the 
use of budget deficits, low cost Reserve Bank credit, and loans for 
productive purposes, would help see New Zealand through times of 
recession. The money supply should be carefully controlled by the 
government to prevent, on the one hand, speculation and inflation and, 
on the other hand, credit squeezes, high interest rates and barriers to 
productive investment. 
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The first Labour Government between 1936 an~d 1939 brought the 
Reserve Bank totally under government ownership, restored the 
industrial arbitration system, introduced a forty-hour worldng week and 
a minimum basic wage, made union membership compuls~ory, set up a 
guaranteed price scheme and a state marketing system for dairy 
produce, built state houses financed by low interest ( 1.25 per cent) 
Reserve Bank credit, greatly expanded education, established a 
comprehensive state broadcasting system, and removed state discrimina-
tion against Maori. The major achievement was undoubtedly the Social 
Security Act of 1938 which increased pensions and the family benefit 
and introduced a national health scheme, largely free to patients and 
funded by a special income tax. 
By the 1940s not only the Labour Party but also the New Zealan~d 
National Party had come to accept the legitin1acy, the necessity and the 
desirability of the government regulating to maintain a 1nixed economy 
and the welfare state. There was a broad and largely unchallenged 
consensus for almost forty years that New Zealand had found a 
successful middle road between laissez faire capitalism and state 
socialism; employers and employees; private sector and public sector; 
town and country; rich and poor; powerful and powerless; individual 
and collective; responsibilities and rights. 
But societies, if not basic human values and rights, change over time, 
and so, not coincidentally, do political parties. ~consensus politics in 
New Zealand crumbled during the 1970s and 1980s. Because the media 
and the public like their politics personalised, at first Sir Robert 
Muldoon got the blame. With the advantage of hindsight one can n~ow 
see that he was a symptom rather than a cause of the huge groundswell 
that was disintegrating New Zealand society and politics. Indeed, it can 
be argued that Muldoon was a conservative Canute desperately trying 
to maintain New Zealand's mixed economy, welfare state, intervention-
ist government and Keynesian-humanitarian consensus, which he had 
inherited not only from Sir Keith Holyoake but also from Savage. It 
was not to be. 
The globalisation of the world economy; the energy shocks of the 
1970s; the dramatic and rapid onslaught of technological change, 
especially the information revolution; a protracted and disastrous 
deterioration in New Zealand's tern1s of trade; a long slide into low 
international competitiveness; a failure to tnaintain growth; a rise 
simultaneously in inflation and unemployn1ent; high interest rates, 
pa:tly caused by demand f~r capi~a~ by speculators greedy for capital 
gatns rather than production; nstng overseas debt, reducing the 
government'~ independe?ce and flexibility; persistent budget deficits; 
and the contlnual thwarttng by both employers and unions of govern-
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ment attempts to get agreement on an incomes policy, all undern1ined 
the Keynesian-welfare state structure of post-World War II New 
Zealand. 
Other divisions also appeared, confusing and dislodging previous 
partisan certainties: Vietnam; South African rugby tours; nuclear ship 
visits; abortion; homosexual law reforn1; women's rights; the Treaty of 
Waitangi; the environment. 
Opinions were challenged and for1ned and transmitted by television. 
Images, photo opportunities, and inforrnation-bite headlines became 
more important than reasoned argument in perceptions of events, 
personalities, policies and partisanship. Mass beliefs came from mass 
infor1nation through mass communications. Complex issues were over-
simplified. There developed a chaotic and fickle market-place of ideas, 
opinions, judgements and values. Put daily under a merciless, 
confrontational spotlight, politicians desperately tried to satisfy 
numerous, varied, conflicting and often unrealistic demands and 
expectations. The public started to lose faith not only in the ability but 
also the integrity of those politicians and their parties, and indeed in the 
integrity and efficacy of the process of democratic government itself. 
The Labour Party appears to have lost its way, and its identity, in the 
1960s and 1970s, although some would argue that it happened earlier 
in the 1940s and 1950s. At the 1963 election Labour projected a 'New 
Look'; at the 1966 election it offered a 'New Leader'; at the 1969 
election that 'New Leader' became a 'New Image'. Even Nortnan Kirk, 
however, who held out such hope of a 'New Direction' to the Labour 
Party as he tapped a widespread mood for change in the electorate in 
1972 and led Labour to a deceptive twenty-three seat majority, was 
struggling in the months prior to his death in 1974 to identify and 
articulate precisely what Labour stood for. 
It was much easier for Kirk's successors to identify what Labour 
stood against. That can be summed up in one word: Muldoon. The 
Labour Party, like nearly everyone else involved in or interested in New 
Zealand politics, became fascinated by Muldoon, especially in the 1974-
84 period, and created their own identities as a response to Muldoon. 
Little wonder that many in the Labour Party were attracted to policies 
and positions that were diametrically opposed to his. 
By 1984 a large majority of New Zealanders had had more than 
enough of Muldoon's styles of leadership and government. There was 
widespread public concern about continuing unemployment, massive 
overseas borrowing, renewed inflation, credit squeezes, housing 
shortages, inadequacies in education, the nuclear threat, women's issues, 
increasingly arbitrary intervention and regulation, and a mass of 
subsidies and controls. 
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As in the past, an incoming Labour Government was detertnine~ to 
reverse its predecessor's policies and looked overseas for explanations 
and solutions to the problems it faced. But the intellectual critique and 
policy approach the fourth Labour Government of David L~nge and 
Roger Douglas adopted- a critique and approach resolutely reJected by 
Muldoon - was almost the opposite to that embedded in the Labour 
Party during its fortnative 25 years. Inevitably there was a crisis of 
identity within the ranks of Labour's traditional members and sup-
porters as their government started to implement policies which had 
their origin in the 'New Right' radicalism of Fredrich Hayek, Milton 
Friedn1an, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. 
The history of the fourth Labour Government is well-known and 
fresh in everyone's memory. Labour quickly, decisively and compre-
hensively deregulated the financial sector of the economy, a sector 
traditionally viewed with considerable suspicion by the Labour Party. 
Labour ministers talked about the neutral state and an economic level 
playing field. But the state was clearly not neutral and New Zealanders 
as a whole were clearly not equipped equally to play on the so-called 
level playing field, even if such a field exists, either at home or abroad. 
The major shared values of the traditional Labour Party were rejected 
as a high cost in unen1ployn1ent and poverty was paid in the interests 
of creating a totally free market and destroying the mixed economy. 
The concern of the early Labour Party for collectivism, cooperation, 
consensus and mass consumption appeared to be sacrificed to the 
individualism, competition, consumerism and callous indifference 
fostered by the fourth Labour Government. A few quite substantial 
crumbs, such as the reintroduction of compulsory unionism, the anti-
nuclear legislation, and more attention to the grievances of Maori and 
women, could not adequately compensate for the overall thrust of 
Labour's policies between 1984 and 1990 and the adoption of the 
particular philosophy, indeed dogn1atic ideology, that directed those 
policies. 
In a number of books and articles written over the past twenty years 
I have argued that, while any political party is the product of its history, 
it 111ust also respond to inevitable changes in the con1position, values, 
demands, technology, econon1ic realities and sectional relationships of 
its society. To do otherwise is to risk becorning irrelevant and being 
sh~uldere.d aside by . an increasingly alienated electorate. Any party 
which cJ1ngs exclusively and tin1idly to its traditional base risks 
retaini~g only enough votes to become a pennanent minority. 
Durtng the late 1970s and the early 198~0s the New Zealand Labour 
Party, at first hesitantly, with n1isgivings and oonsiderable internal 
strife, did respond to those changes both organisationally and 
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programmatically .. But the necessary response to social change and a 
broadening of a party's electoral appeal invariably imposes considerable 
strain on the party as it tensely debates its philosophy, attitudes, 
policies, representative nature, desire constituency, goals, leadership, 
and ways it funds and organises itself. With the Labour Party during 
the 1984-90 period the response went too far and eventually confused, 
then angered and finally enraged many of Labour's traditional core 
support. After Arnold Nordmeyer's 'Black Budget' of 1958 I wrote that 
the grassroots membership of the Labour Party became sparse and 
parched. After Rogemomics there were no grassroots, only some hardy 
flaxroots in the swamp. 
Arrogantly, Labour forced through changes for which it had no 
mandate even from its own supporters. M,ore freedom, power and 
wealth were given to the already influential and affluent but for the less 
fortunate Labour's policies and actions devastated their lives, their 
aspirations, their security. An increasing percentage of New Zealanders 
became individuals lonely and afraid in a world they never made, over 
which they had no control, and which they could not understand. 
The disparate and in the longer tertn incompatible voting alliance that 
returned the fourth Labour Government to office for a second term in 
August 1987 was not an organic, healthy or stable regeneration of the 
party. The first Labour Government had completely changed the 
economic, social and political face of New Zealand after 1935. Labour 
made New Zealand, even if not perfect, much closer to its supporters' 
ideal of how they wanted it to be. Fifty years later there was cle:'rly 
need for reforn1: for some deregulation; greater efficiency and 
accountability; less waste; improvements to the health and education 
systems; a revamped public service; less arbitrary and capricious 
government; a freeing-up of the economy with less protection and 
subsidies. But the fourth Labour government went much further than 
that and for the second time this century again radically altered the 
socio-economic landscape, this time moving the centre of gravity 
sharply to the right. The fourth National Government elected in October 
1991 may have continued where Labour left off, but the essential 
demolition of the Keynesian welfare state had already taken place. It is 
doubtful that any National government would ever have been allowed 
to do what Labour did without massive resistance from the trade union 
movement and the many other pressure groups in New Zealand. 
Political parties are created, dramatically transfortned, and sometimes 
destroyed in times of considerable economic crisis and social instability. 
Especially in times of electoral defeat, when disappointment, disillusion, 
frustration, and recrimination are reflected in disputes over personalities, 
issues, priorities, policies, tactics and even ultimate goals, there is a 
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strong possibility that a major disaster such as an econo~ic depress~on 
or a war will split an existing party and transfer a substantial proportion 
of its traditional support either to a new or existing alternative party. In 
the absence of an acceptable alternative, and especially in a bipolar 
party system such as New Zealand, voters who do not wish because of 
residual prejudice to change to another long-detested existing party are 
forced reluctantly either to continue supporting what for them has now 
become the lesser of two evils or to drift into non-voting. It is perhaps 
worth noting that had Ken Douglas, as president of the Confederation 
of Trade Unions, not thrown his weight behind the Labour Party after 
the fotrnation of NewLabour and before the 1990 election, even at the 
expense of splitting the Socialist Unity Party of which he is the leader, 
Labour's 1990 defeat might well have been even more devastating. 
Today Mike Moore and the Labour Party appear to be trying to 
renounce the legacy of Roger Douglas and revert to a more traditional 
Labour position. That is difficult for men and won1en who were key 
figures in the fourth Labour Government. Other parties with no such 
legacy and more moral authority now compete with Labour for the right 
to speak for the unemployed, the poor, and the powerless. NewLabour, 
Mana Motuhake, the Democrats, the Greens, the Liberals, and even a 
section of the National Party personified though not led by Muldoon 
and Winston Peters attack the New Right, whether Rogemomics or the 
Ruth Richardson version, even more harshly and loudly than does the 
Labour Party. And therein lies Labour's dilemn1a. Neither New Zealand 
nor the Labour Party can ever be the same as they were in the past. 
Both have changed too much. 
Is 'home' what the Labour Party stood for in 1916, or in 1935, or in 
1957, or in 1972, or in 1984, 1987, or 1990? 'Home' to Ken Douglas, 
in both organisational and policy senses, has a totally different meaning 
from what it suggests to Roger Douglas. Where do Mike Moore and the 
rest of Labour see home as being? Somehow there has to be a 
recognition and a combining of past ideals and values with a recogni-
tion that the problems facing New Zealand in the 1990s and the 21st 
century cannot be solved by dogn1atically following theories set out 
fifty, a hundred, or more years before. Neither the doctrines of Karl 
Marx nor Adam Smith nor John Stuart Mill nor the numerous variations 
of their disciples, despite the insights they may well provide, are a 
suitable comprehensive blueprint for the future. Common sense 
compassion and a commitment to the common good might be a bette; 
set of guidelines as Labour looks to the future. To dwell too much on 
the past or to see~ to r~tum t? an ~arl~er h?me which, perhaps always 
at least partly existed 1n the tmagtnatton, IS a recipe for disillusion if 
not delusion. 
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That doesn't mean that Labour in the 1990s cann~ot, however, create 
a contemporary home which incorporates some of the features, the 
inhabitants, and the outlooks of the past. ~Certainly, it must try to put 
together again the alliance of the less powerful and less fortunate in 
society, the unions, the Maori, Pacific Islanders, feminists, environ-
mentalists, anti-war and anti-nuclear voters, the secular and religious 
humanitarians, and the advocates of social justice. It will not be easy 
and it will not be enough. Other voters will want to be convinced that 
Labour is more than a protest party, that it does have answers to 
contemporary problems. Labour could do worse, if it is to continue 
looking overseas for ideas, than examine Ger111any's 'social capitalism', 
because, while wealth has to be created before it can be partially 
redistributed, if the less fortunate are ignored neither the health .of the 
economy nor the health of the society can be guaranteed; and the 
~Getnlans still seem to recognise and respect that relationship. But one 
wonders whether New Zealand needs slavishly to copy any overseas 
model. Perhaps we should simply apply some common sense indigen-
ous solutions while recognising the restraints of being locked into the 
global economy. Labour could weave together the strands of social 
concern, participatory democracy, and nationalism based on ethnic, 
environmental and nuclear concerns, to present a clear alternative to a 
National Party that has moved to a more centre-right and international-
ist position. 
Just as Moore has set out to return Labour to its home so, as I said 
at the start of this paper, Lee's Albany Porcello returned to Riversdale 
in great expectation: 
One should never go back. The four-roomed house was a decrepit shanty. The 
huge section was a miserable comer of ground. The pond was a filthy puddle. 
The pines did not pierce the sky, did not even impede passing clouds. The 
neighbourhood seemed incredibly weary, void of fomance. What had been 
heaven to the child was so fearfully dull that my mind could not recapture any 
thrills ... No birds sang magical notes from tall steeples. I was soon back in the 
car ... I wanted to escape with my memories intact, escape before I yawned. I 
wanted to get near the _place I had once known, and I could do that only by 
running away. Do we run away when we verbally recapitulate? Make the 
sordid romantic? 
Memory never flows in a clear stream. There are huge blanks with vivid 
patches here and there, as though one's mind were a camera which registered 
some impressions with brilliant sunlight clarity while being pertnanently closed 
to others. Sometimes it is a quality in the happening that is recorded, and 
ocular details are blurred in the glow of such a quality. Some memories seem 
to have registered the pulsation of each heartbeat, and yet that moment may 
be the only one remembered in long months. The milestones are remembered 
because of their unusual detail, the miles because of the monotonous quality 
of the detail. And one cannot be sure that the milestones are registered 
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chronologically. Confused jumbles of happenings and half memories, shadowy 
recollections, surround instants, sometimes hours, of brilliant mental recording. 
It is dangerous to live in the past. While a party, like a person or a 
nation, which forgets the past may be doomed to relive it, it is also true 
that history can bind and blind. The Bible says that without a vision of 
the future a people perish; and so does a political party. If 'home' 
means a retreat into yesterday, to the Labour Party of 1916 or even 
1935 rather than the 1990s, then perhaps Roger Douglas was right at 
least in leaving tlte security of that home and trying to understand and 
struggle with the challenges of the present and the future. The new 
home he tried to create, however, was not one the Labour Party could 
ever have lived in comfortably. It will be interesting to see if Mike 
Moore can do better. 
Notes 
1. John A. Lee, Children of the Poor (Christchurch, 1973). 
2. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (London 
1988). ' 
The Rise and Fall of the Market 
Liberals in the Labour Party 
Colin James1 
The mythology about the years 1984-90 in the Labour Party is that the 
party in government was captured by a small cabal of monetarist/free-
market ideologues. These ideologues are commonly supposed to have 
wreaked havoc on the economy, on the prized social services estab-
lished by the first Labour Government, on the security which that 
Government promised to all and, most heinous of all, on cherished and 
venerated beliefs and tenets of the Party. 
Within the Labour Party this mythology was given its most dramatic 
expression at the conference in November 1987. A Government which 
had won re-election just three months earlier with an increased share of 
the vote and an increased parliamentary majority (though a smaller 
plurality of the vote) was pilloried and vilified in an atmosphere of 
distrust and recrimination. Eighteen months later a segment of the party 
split off, after failing at the 1988 conference to win the presidency in 
order to force a standoff between the party organisation and the cabinet. 
Under the leadership of Jim Anderton, who had been president from 
1979-84 and was the unsuccessful challenger in 1988, the defectors 
fort ned the New Labour Party dedicated to preservation of the principles 
of the Labour Party as they had been traditionalised and the economic 
policies through which they had been translated into practice. 
The essence of the mythology was that the small cabal of usurpers, 
in order to redress -economic ills which were exaggerated and/or 
wrongly defined, was using means which by their nature would, and 
were intended to, lead to a social order different in fundamental 
respects from that pursued by the Labour Party since its fortnation in 
1916. From 1986 on, Rogemomics, as the policy line had come to be 
known after the Finance Minister, Sir Roger Douglas, was therefore 
ritually condemned at Labour Party conferences. 
11 
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The cabal was indeed small, even in the mythology. From 1984-87, 
it consisted of Douglas, his two Associate Ministers of Finance, Richard 
Prebble and David Caygill, who held the economically important 
portfolios of transport and trade and industry, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs and Local Government, Michael Bassett and Douglas's 
parliamentary undersecretary, Trevor de Cleene, cheer-led on the back 
benches by Peter Neilson who had chaired the caucus economics 
committee in opposition. They were wilfully aided and abetted by the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, and, for a time, the Prime 
Minister, David Lange, and fellow-travelled with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm by the likes of Phil Goff and Colin Moyle in the cabinet 
and David Butcher, Jim and Bill Sutton, Annette King, Bill Jeffries, 
Peter Dunne and Clive Matthewson outside the cabinet, almost all of 
whom came into the cabinet at some time from 1987 on. Fellow-
travelling was insidious: by early 1989 even Helen Clark, a pillar of the 
left then on her way to the deputy prime ministership, was regarded as 
a fellow-traveller for capping health spending; so were a number of 
other senior MPs and eventual ministers, such as, for example, Margaret 
Austin, who would have been dismayed in 1987 to have been numbered 
among those in the cabal. 
But for such a small cabal to have been able radically to depart from 
Labour principles and, the mythology would have it, to have caused 
havoc in the economy at terrible cost to Labour supporters and to both 
stay in power within the Government and to get that Government re-
elected with a larger share of the vote, it must have possessed astonish-
ing, indeed mythical, powers. 
This was at a time when the party organisation outside Parliament 
was unmistakably in the hands of the liberal-left.2 The president from 
1984-87, Margaret Wilson, was an avowed socialist and the great bulk 
of senior elected and appointed officials were also. The majority of the 
Labour Party caucus would have been horrified at the 1984 election to 
have been described as 'new right' or even 'more-market', then the 
more comn1on phrase. Further1nore, the 1987 re-election was at a time 
when opinion polls were expressing widespread public disapproval of 
elements of the econon1ic policy line. 
The usual explanations for this paradox are institutional. They have 
gone something like this: 
• a combination of cabinet discipline and the distraction of unsympath-
etic ministers from economic issues by the heavy w,orkloads in their 
own portfolios locked in the cabinet; the traditionally tight New 
Zealand parliamentary party discipline locked out the back bench 
from a realistic possibility of challenging or overturning cabinet 
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decisions, short of bringing the Government down which long 
traditions of Labour loyalty rejected; 
• in a small polity with no forttlal checks and balances, government 
has traditionally been conducted by a small number of bureaucrats 
and ministers, usually testing their moves with a small number of 
outside grandees in business, the unions and other interest groups, all 
on first-name tertns and thus able to act swiftly, infortnally and with 
little constraint; 
• the Treasury and the Reserve Bank dominated channels of economic 
advice to the Government and had been converted to a deregulatory 
economic prescription during the years in which Sir Robert Muldoon 
was Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, from 1975-84; a 
Treasury officer was seconded to the office of the leader of the 
Opposition; 
• the Treasury was supported by a powerful clique of like-minded big 
business operators through the Business Roundtable; 
• there had been a pre-election agreement by the cabal inside the 
Labour Party, partly drawing on analysis by the seconded Treasury 
officer, to move in a deregulatory direction and this had not been 
clearly spelt out to the bulk of the Labour Party and the electorate, 
partly because it met vigorous, though unsuccessful opposition, in 
the upper echelons of the party at the time the manifesto was being 
written; 
• a foreign exchange crisis at the time of the 1984 election enabled 
Douglas and the Treasury to take a series of quick deregulatory 
decisions immediately on election which put the new cabinet on a 
path which it became progressively more difficult to get off; and the 
initial steps along that path were the more readily and broadly 
accepted because of the extremes of regulation to which the Muldoon 
regime had subjected important components of the economy, 
including wages, from 1982. 
To these are sometimes added a wistful recognition that the Labour 
Party in general had taken little interest in economic policy. For 
example, even at the 1985 conference at which approval was given to 
the Government to broaden the tax base to include the universal value 
added tax, GST, and thus, symbolically, the deregulatory direction was 
endorsed, remits on education outnumbered those on economics on the 
order paper. Economic management policy had hitherto been taken 
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almost as a given of near tablets-of-stone variety, with little attention 
to re-examining or updating it in the face of changing circumstances. 
As a result, organised intellectual resistance to the deregulatory 
economic policy line, either from outside the cabinet or within it, was 
difficult, if not impossible. 
All of this is true. But it does not explain the upheaval of 1984-90; 
or, even if it does, it does not explain why the upheaval kept going 
once a 'corrective' deregulation had been applied to the Muldoon 
excesses and after the Labour Party (almost all of whose new MPs 
elected in 1987 were of the liberal-left), the Prime Minister (at the end 
of 1987) and the public woke up to the cabal's supposed intentions. It 
does not explain the conversion of many initial opponents - for 
example, Rob Campbell, a supposedly 'left' trade unionist - to strong 
or qualified support of the policies or, within the Labour caucus, the 
acquiescence of the majority, most of whom were not, never have been 
and never will be 'new right'. 
I want to suggest there were two important additional ingredients in 
the mix which largely account for this mystery. One was the changing 
conditions in which policy had to be for1ned. I have written about this 
elsewhere3 and will bring the material together in a book to be 
published early next year. I will simply list those conditions here. 
1 Our place in the world changed enort11ously, from the bosom of the 
dominant empire in which we had a symbiotic economic, political, 
military and sentimental relationship with the centre, to the outer 
courtyard of the emerging Asian empires of Japan and China. In a 
number of ways, insulation or isolation from or even smorgasbord 
interaction with the outside world became progressively less 
practicable: finance was intemationalising, business was globalising, 
satellites had made communications progressively cheaper and more 
instantaneous and environmental 'interconnectedness' was increasing-
ly apparent to increasing numbers. Self-protective (colonial-mindset) 
options had not been realistically available since at least the early 
1980s. 
2 There was a serious economic problem: there were major 
macroeconomic distortions; international competitiveness (and 
therefore earning power) was lacking in both product mix and 
man~ge.men.t practices; . th~re ~as a consequential prospect of a 
conttnutng long-tern1 dechne 1n the ter111s of trade and attendant 
~cono~c, social and therefore political pressures. Incremental 
ttnkenng was no longer a realistic option; root and branch change 
was necessary. 
n 
' 
' 
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3 A strong and increasingly successful intellectual challenge had been 
mounted internationally to the forJner prevailing social democratic 
consensus. In its place had developed what is called in some quarters 
the Washington consensus, which is now driving economic policy on 
all continents to a greater or lesser - and increasingly to a greater -
degree. The intellectual shift profoundly affected younger bureaucrats 
and other economic analysts in New Zealand in the early 1980s. 
4 The trend was bucked by Muldoon who went backwards into 
liberalisation, resisted substantial change in state management and 
when confronted with serious macroeconomic problems in 1982 
reverted to direct regulation. Muldoon progressively lost credibility 
with a wide cross-section of the intelligentsia and interest groups and 
within his own party. The New Zealand Party split was a symptom 
of that. 
The second major reason was the nature of the people who became 
converted to the policy shift within the Labour Party and the way in 
which they came to be converted. They were mostly people who came 
to maturity in the 1960s. That was a time of challenge to authority and 
authorised ideas. The Labour market-liberals were therefore not afraid 
to question established orthodoxies. They were by nature iconoclasts. 
They were almost all university-educated professionals, which had 
given them a middle-class lifestyle enorrnously different from that of 
the people who had written the Labour economic tablets of stone. They 
were not 'working class', except in parentage. They were not driven by 
the same concerns for individual security that had been at the heart of 
Labour economic and social orthodoxy. If they understood the need for 
security, it was from the head rather than the heart. 
Education had led them mostly into occupations in which they used 
their heads. They were rationalists rather than sentimentalists. Problems 
could be solved by rational analysis and rational proposition. They were 
not constrained by a need for ideological security. Three of them had 
economics degrees and a number of others had studied some econ-
omics. There is some -basis to David Cay gill's claim to me4 that 'we 
were the most economically literate caucus' New Zealand had seen. 
Caygill adds that this did not just equip them to read Treasury papers 
with a degree of comprehension that exceeded that of previous cabinets, 
but added a dimension to their approach to problem-solving: economists 
are trained to examine the impact one change in one area has on 
conditions in another area. So, for example, education (spend more to 
get better education) could not be considered in isolation from the 
impact of taxation on wealth-generation - as both parties and govern-
ments had tended to do in the past. It should be added that even in the 
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1960s economists at university argued the merit of markets over 
administered economic solutions. 
They were also an elite. In an educational meritocracy they were the 
meritocrats. Their selection by a liberal-left Labour Party was not 
anachronistic - they were selected because they were to a large extent 
the brightest and best available. They accepted a leadership role and 
accepted the divorce from ordinary New Zealanders that brought with 
it. They saw this as a temporal divorce, not one of fundamental 
incompatibility. In time, once the results started to flow and the 
practicality of what they were doing became apparent, ordinary New 
Zealanders would rejoin them. 
As a variant on that, they were comfortable with change - and, in 
keeping with their iconoclasm, that change could be radical. In this they 
showed something of the characteristics Alain Touraine has divined 
among leaders of political social movements.5 The Labour market-
liberals were not looking for a new perntanent solution. If anything, 
they would get bored in such a paradise. 
It is also important to say what they were not. They were not 
believers in the minimal state or rampant individualism or economic 
libertarianism. They all subscribed and, with one, possiltly two, 
exceptions, still subscribe to broad social democratic objectives. As they 
saw it, they were at odds with their opponents in the Labour Party and 
among the public, not over ends, but over means, not over their belief 
about the just society, but about the technique of achieving it. 
They valued freedom in themselves and in others (hence their social 
democratic choice of party). And they were technocratic in their 
approach to issues, problems and solutions. That might, and frequently 
did, lead them to radical solutions, but not because they believed in a 
system of thought of which those solutions were an integral and 
inescapable part, but because they were deemed relevant and necessary 
to address the problem. 
When they applied these qualities to economic policy these techno-
liberals found market solutions were the vogue techniques on offer from 
their fellows in the bureaucracy. They applied them. That made them 
market-liberals. 
Note, market-liberals, not market-libertarians. They were not 
believers in a new Nozick.ian or even Hayekian or Friedmanite or 
Murray-ish society. They were practical technocrats with a strong dash 
of operational or temperamental radicalism, not believers in a radical 
philosophy. 
A crude chart of the difference between market-liberals and market-
libertarians might go something like this: 
Market liberals generally ag~ee that: 
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• markets generate wealth, that is, economic welfare, better than any 
other foriil of economic organisation 
• clear price signals are important to the efficient wealth-creating 
functioning of markets 
• price signals are clouded by almost every government intervention 
in markets; this especially applies to border protection and protective 
internal regulation of business; such interventions should therefore 
be kept to a minimum consistent with social objectives and sound 
functioning of markets 
• however, some market activities themselves occlude price signals and 
in some economic activity markets disappear, in which case 
government intervention is necessary to secure economic welfare 
• price signals are an important indicator of the efficiency and 
therefore effectiveness of government administration 
• governments are inappropriate owners of commercial enterprises 
because governments often or usually set conflicting objectives for 
commercial enterprises they own and because governments should 
not put taxpayers' money at commercial risk, both on grounds of 
competence as commercial operators and on grounds of trusteeship 
• economic welfare is one element of general welfare, which also 
includes self-fulfilment, good health, adequate housing, leisure and 
emotional and spiritual fulfilment 
• markets are inappropriate or ineffective mechanisms for creating 
some other elements of general welfare objectives or their economic 
welfare outcomes may compromise social welfare; in the case of 
social welfare objectives, the government has an active role to 
intervene, as agent of the people, to achieve those objectives, either 
by regulating, managing or supplanting markets; however, even in 
those cases, there may be some role for price signals to guide 
consumer responses 
• in pursuit of social welfare objectives the government denies 
economic resources to economic welfare-creating activity and can 
have other effects on economic welfare creation; the government has 
a responsibility to set a balance between economic welfare creation 
and government-created social welfare such that each is optimised 
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Market-libertarians generally believe: 
• individuals are the basic unit of economic organisation 
• individuals know what is good and right for them; governments do 
not; individuals make rational economic choices in their own best 
interests 
• governments have a very limited and maybe no role in intervening 
in markets for economic welfare objectives 
• markets are an appropriate organisation for delivery of much social 
welfare; governments need intervene only to the extent that markets 
do not deliver social welfare to some people 
• delivery of social welfare is akin organisationally to delivery of 
economic welfare; social welfare delivery agencies are 'businesses' 
with 'clients' and 'consumers' 
The important difference for my purposes in this chart is not the 
individual items, though they show a gulf in belief systems between the 
two categories of people. It is the diffefence between rational agree-
ment, the quality I have ascribed to market-liberals, and belief, which 
I have ascribed to libertarians. One is a matrix for finding solutions, 
albeit sometin1es radical solutions; the other is a charter for a new 
ociety. 
Co11fusion of these two elements is at the heart of much of the 
muddle in analysis of or debate or argument about the economic 
refoiin of the fourth Labour Government. Supporters mostly argue that 
what the Government set about was rational problem-solving (which 
may or may not have been technically cotiect); opponents lump all 
upporters of the reforn1 in with the market-libertarians who did want 
to change ociet . Hence man critic of the fourth Labour Go ernment 
con tantl aw or thought the aw a 'new right' Jerusalem in the 
making - and their people making it - when the objects of their 
riti i m thought the were fi ing up a broke social democratic 
n1a hin . The dun1b ere talking to the deaf. 
It i in tru ti e to a k ho the Labour market-liberal came to that 
po iti n. One b one they a they found an incongruence be cen 
intention and outcome in element of the economic construct that had 
been put in pla e b th Labour Party in the 19 Os and 1940s and 
largel ontinued and con rted to it own end b the ational Patty 
in the 19 0 -70 . 
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For example, David Caygill recalls6 innocently asking the head of 
the Mines Department at a parliamentary select committee in the early 
1980s which mines were contributing most to that year's loss by the 
department. He was struck by the bureaucrat's reply: that the depart-
ment did not keep figures on individual mines and did not know what 
it cost to extract coal from each one or what its surplus or deficit was. 
Peter Dunne7 recalls taking up a job in the mid-1970s in the import 
licensing section of the Department of Trade and Industry. Dunne 
believed in the intent of import licensing (to protect jobs and develop 
industry) and in its efficacy in achieving that objective. But he found 
that licensing was administered in a way that bore tenuous relation to 
the rules and gradually came to the conclusion that it did not achieve 
the objective. 
Peter Neilson came from a strong Labour background and even took 
up employment in a 'soft' department, the Labour Department. There 
he watched unemployment become 'a growth industry' and gradually 
came to conclude that existing policies, which aimed to guarantee no 
one would lose, in fact were locking out large numbers of New 
Zealanders who could not take advantage of the intemationalisation of 
the economy that was seeping through the protective barriers. He 
concluded that going to a more centrally planned economy was not an 
option and so was led towards market prescriptions.8 
This was a progressive process. For example, Caygill's coal mines 
experience and subsequent experiences of a similar kind had led him by 
1984 to favour some degree of commercialisation of state trading 
departments, the exact fortn of which was detettnined by Palmer in late 
1986. At that time he did not expect or favour privatisation and until 
late in the Government's period of office he approved privatisation only 
as a means of reducing debt and avoiding capital outlays on state 
enterprises that could only be afforded by raising debt. Ownership, he 
considered, was not important as a deter111inant of the efficiency or 
profitability of an enterprise. But he changed his view on that when in 
1989 one after another of the state-owned enterprises chairs infortned 
him how well their enterprises were doing but that dividends would not 
be possible for some time because considerable capital investment was 
needed. Only because they were owned by the state, Caygill concluded, 
could they afford to contemplate such empire-building. 
The same story can be told of one after another of the ministers and 
MPs who became market-liberals, or in the common parlance, 'Roger-
gnomes'. They came up against the practical limits to existing policies 
achieving the objectives set for them or their ineffectuality or 
counterproductiveness. This is the early motivation of the arch-
Rogergnome himself, Douglas. Douglas, like the others after him, 
concluded, not that the Labour objectives were wrong or unachievable, 
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but that existing policies were at least failing to achieve. ~em and 
probably denying their achievement. Like ~any modem C~sbans, the 
more they questioned, the more previously unquesboned, even 
unquestionable, assumptions came into questi.on against the cri~rion of 
end-achievability: were they blocking the achievement of a desired end; 
if not, were they necessary to achieve the desired end and, if not, were 
they the most effective and most efficient means to that end? 
It is noteworthy that, despite its reputation, Douglas's 1980 book, 
There's Got to be a Better Way, was not the 'new right's' equivalent 
of Mein Kampf. Douglas did not set out in that book an ideology which 
he then proceeded to put into effect in office. There were many 
elements of what became his policy line once in office; but there were 
also many elements that were not. Most notable was his enthusiastic 
proposition for a national development bank which would pick winners 
and inject state capital into them; in the 1981 election campaign he 
fleshed that out into an illustrative proposal for 16 carpet factories. 
In fact, Douglas remained until late in his parliamentary career 
convinced he was actually helping to build the sort of society Labour 
had always wanted. In the introduction to the 1987 Budget he even 
invoked Sir Walter Nash in support of his goals. 
The goals of that first Labour Government are in essence the same as those we 
aspire to today. The means of achieving them has inevitably changed in 
response to the times; but the goals themselves, the principles our predecessors 
stood for, have not changed. Labour's manifesto of 1935, drafted by Walter 
Nash, embodied a clear acceptance of the Government's responsibility for the 
welfare of all citizens - in particular the workers, the frail, the aged and the 
very young. It sought to restore for all, in Nash's words, 'a decent living 
standard.' 9 
In a speech in March 1988, he said: 
Certainly, part of our job is to create an environment in which New Zealanders 
can increase the wealth of the nation. The other equally important bit of it is 
to even up the odds a bit for any sector, group or person who starts from a 
di~advantage~ positio_n ... Sometimes you ha~e to provide disadvantaged groups 
with extra assistance tn order to get the playtng fields level to start with ... [The 
obje~tives of th~ Govem~ent ~e] a better quality of life, jobs, pay, health, 
houstng, educanon, secunty, fatr access for everyone to those benefits, a fair 
opportunity f?r people to achieve their own human potential ... Good govern-
ment should It berate people, _not enslave them, either to the state or the private 
se~tor. ~eople n~ed ~ genuine guarantee of dignity, security, the ability to 
enJOY h~e even tf thtngs go wrong for them. Otherwise you end up with 
beggars 1n the street and the rich living behind barbed wire. But security alone 
is not enough. Nobody wants to live forever dependent on the government. Our 
job is to open out the future for people at every level. Those who start behind 
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the line need more opportunity, not less, than people who start with an 
advantage. 10 
The 1984-90 Labour Government did not set out to give effect to a 
'new right' ideology. Its members were not at the outset market-
libertarians champing at the bit to set New Zealanders free of a state 
that was their enemy, as Ruth Richardson is. They became market-
liberals because practicality led them to conclude traditional social 
democratic mechanisms did not achieve social democratic ends and if 
those ends were to be achieved, other means had to be adopted which, 
given their iconoclastic temperament, might be bold, unconventional 
and radical. At hand were the collection of neo-liberal and neo-classical 
economic and management theories, in which their advisers had become 
well-versed and which appealed to their rational, problem-solving 
dispositions. One-time long-haired student radical Phil Goff, for 
example, did not accede to the economic programme because he had a 
damascene conversion; he saw it as a rational (albeit radical) solution 
to a problem of resources and needs. 
But, whatever the protestations by the chief actors in the 1984-90 
policy shift and by their fellow-travellers that they were not market-
libertarians, that they were not 'new right' - and they all still make 
those protestations - there are six senses in which that label is not 
inapt. 
First, in making the shift, a 'pure' line was often followed that 
caused unnecessary economic and social damage and frequently that 
damage was in the face of well-founded practical warnings that the 
damage would occur. To some extent, the defence can credibly be 
mounted that stopping to heed such warnings might well have (probably 
would have) bogged the policy changes down and denied the longer-
terin benefits. Some excess, in other words, was deemed better than 
failure. This line has often been used by Douglas to defend the 
sequencing of his policy changes against the valid charge that they 
pushed interest rates and the currency to levels that caused serious and 
excessive damage to production. Others put it in a slightly different, but 
essentially similar, way: the decks had to be cleared in order to rebuild. 
Second, much of that rigidity and excessiveness is traceable to the 
fact that many of the market-based prescriptions adopted by the Labour 
cabinet derived indirectly from 'new right' analyses. Jonathan Boston, 
for example, has distilled four such principal influences in the reforn1 
of state services organisation and management. 11 The inft uence of 
people such as James Buchanan and Charles Murray can be seen in 
much of the Treasury's analysis and prescriptions and filtered through 
into both Douglas's policy line, particulary on social policy, from 1987 
and some of the Government's decisions. 
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Third, this could the more readily occur because many of the policy 
reforn1ers had been, or at least lived, through a libertarian phase - not 
in economic thinking, but in attitudes to moral and civil rigidities. 
Many had grown up through the sixties in which moral and civil 
libertarianism was extolled and widely practised - if not directly by 
them, at least by others whom they could comfortably tolerate. There 
was therefore an experience of past coexistence with a libertarian 
approach, even if not specific current endorsement of libertarian ideas 
on economic and social policy. 
So, while they were not market-libertarians themselves, the Labour 
market-liberals presided over a policy shift which included some 
policies that were readily describable as being, and in many cases were, 
market-libertarian. The overall approach to deregulation, whether of 
banks, financial markets and securities markets, airlines and ports, 
telecommunications and electricity generation, industry assistance (apart 
from tariffs which still remain high where they are in force) or taxation, 
often had a libertarian ring. Even if privatisation was primarily intended 
to cut debt, it was conducted in a freewheeling manner with some 
decidedly shady characters. Much of the state sector refor111 was 
concerned with issues of efficiency and individual choice, which, while 
it did not rule out concepts of service and collective welfare, often 
overshadowed it in rhetoric and jargon and sometimes in fact. Unem-
ployed were mostly left to lie where they fell, individuals on their own 
except for income maintenance and some largely cosmetic training 
schemes, rather than citizens of an integrated community. Industrial 
disputes were mostly left to the participants, no matter how tough the 
employers' stance, and on the relatively rare occasions behind-scenes 
nudges and winks were given, they usually went employers' way. 
Overall, the Labour Government reduced the degree to which the state 
was involved in economic activity - central planning and 'picking 
winners' became anathema- and the degree to which the state actively 
guaranteed individual security and actively encouraged individual 
choice and initiative. That direction was consistent with a move towards 
market-libertarianism. 
Fourth, some tipped over the edge into market-libertarianism. 
Douglas wanted user-charges in health, commercialisation of the 
Housing Corporation, social services vouchers and labour market 
?eregulati.on ~im~lar to what the present Government is now doing. Late 
In the pnvattsation orgy Prebble was candidly arguing that it was 
necessary because private ownership and management were more 
efficient than state ownership even if the management followed private 
sector principles. Several ministers would have been prepared to go 
much f~rther than Clark's limited acceptance of the concept of 
contracting out some wards to non-state, even private, management; 
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state ownership of hospitals ceased to be seen by some as necessary to 
effici~ent, effective provision of universal access to secondary health 
services. De Cleene was closer to Ruth Richardson in many respects 
than to 90 per cent of his Labour colleagues. 
Fifth, even if most stopped short of going over that edge, they did 
develop a bunker-like obduracy against challenges or questioning, 
which critics describe as a refusal to debate issues. This developed out 
of the general siege mentality of a cabinet under increasing and hostile 
pressure rather than as a result of adoption of the ideology that went 
with the positions; the lifting of the siege with the election defeat has 
brought with it a more relaxed attitude (Goff is a good example). But 
at the time that distinction was not readily discernible. 
Sixth, this rigidity in the face of opposition in turn fuelled and gave 
some credence to critics' arguments that means were beginning to 
detertnine ends. This remains a moot point, but if means were 
detennining ends, some of the means could lead only to market-
libertarian ends. 
There is therefofe some truth to descriptions that Labour from 1984-
90 was a Government of the 'new right'. 
Tnere is also a great deal of inaccuracy about the accusation. Most 
of the moves that many see as examples of market-libertarianism were 
no more than the introduction of some market discipline to improve 
state efficiency (for example, pettilitting social service agencies and 
departments to contract out to private enterprise ancillary work 
previously done by public employees) or to reduce moral hazard (for 
example, in introducing a small charge for pharn1aceutical prescriptions 
to cut over-use of drugs - not to make people pay for what they used). 
It was not what was in the December 17 1987 package that was 
evidence of market-libertarianism, but what did not get into it. In fact, 
the bulk of the cabinet, once Douglas could not get his way in that 
package, made it clear in the course of the first six months or so of 
1988 they would hold back from full-blown market-libertarianism. 
They explicitly rejected selling off the hospital system and schools 
and they kept the Housing Corporation as a provider of houses at 
subsidise,d rents. Far- from cutting social spending, they massively 
increased spending in real (above-inflation) ter111S on health, education 
and welfare and shifted the incidence of spending from subsidising and 
protecting industry to social spending. While they introduced concepts 
of efficiency an,d decentralised management (which led to some odd 
results as administrators attempted, with varying success, to learn to 
become managers) and they radically refor1ned state sector financial 
management along private sector lines, that was not to cut the size of 
the state but to strengthen its perfortrtance; overall state service staff 
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numbers went up, not down. Flexibility was encouraged in industrial 
r~lations, but unions retained their state backing. 
The Labour Government was also powerfully interventionist in 
markets in some respects. Policy on the Treaty of Waitangi, pay equity 
for women, union education and nuclear warship visits cut across 
private commercial interests. All those policies had strong support from 
most market-liberals. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, the distinction between market-
liberalism and market-libertarianism was lost on the public. In taking 
a strong direction away from state intervention in the economy, in 
demanding efficiency as an element in state administration and social 
services delivery, in introducing an element of client choice into those 
services (for example, Tomorrow's Schools), and so on, the Labour 
Government appeared to large numbers of New Zealanders to be 
market-libertarians. 
Jack Vowles may have more to say about this in his paper, but 
market-libertarianism- or whatever tag, such as 'free market', ordinary 
New Zealanders put on it - was not generally desired in 1984, nor in 
1987, nor in 1990, nor now. The hidden story - though one clearly 
delineated in polling analyses- of the 1987 election was the developing 
switch-off in middle New Zealand and in Labour's core vote. The 
survey findings of the Royal Commission on Social Policy in 1988, the 
Massey study of values in 1989 and, I understand, Vowles' and 
Aimer's findings after the 1990 election portray an electorate more in 
favour of state intervention than the Labour Government delivered and 
more in favour of state assurance of social services than Labour was 
perceived to deliver. Hence the electoral fall of Labour's market-
liberals. 
In addition, both within the Labour Party and outside it there were 
detertnined defenders of the (compared with 1990) 'less-market' 
position. These were sometimes ideological, as in the NewLabour 
breakaway party and the liberal-left within the party. They were 
sometimes motivated by strong altruistic beliefs and/or objectives, such 
as in ensuring the best possible health care as an unchallengeable good 
in itself or in arguing for a 'public service ethic' in the face of what 
seemed like arid managerialism. And they were sometimes motivated 
by personal security, as in the teachers unions who soaked up much of 
the above-inflation spending in the Labour Government's early years or 
industrial unions who watched their memberships devastated under the 
impact of deregulation - labour market flexibility developed to a fairly 
high degree under that impact, well before the National Government's 
deregulation. These people kept up a running barrage of assaults on the 
'new right' Government, lumping all but a few of the ministers and 
MPs in that category. Hence a need for the fall of the market-liberals. 
Market Liberals in the Labour Party 25 
If the Labour Party is to rebuild its links with the people described 
above - and it must if it is to reassemble a durable winning electoral 
coalition - its market-liberals have to fall. A renegade cabal must be 
extirpated; ghosts must be exorcised. The Labour Party conference in 
September presented a curious seance with such ghosts. Few market-
liberals were present in fleshly forn1. The chief market-libertarian 
demon was absent entirely and a couple of his chief assistants present 
only briefly. So catharsis was denied and the exorcism confined to a 
wan assurance by the leader, Mike Moore, that 'Rogernomics has had 
its day'. As a consolation activity, extirpators and exorcisers are left 
with their shadow war against the spectre of a return to Parliament of 
any of the defeated market-liberals - even, in at least one case, one 
who has explicitly denied plans to return. 
The 'had its day' phrase has been aphorised as 'Rogemomics is 
dead'. But that is not what it says. It says that Rogernomics has had its 
day, but, as Moore explicitly said, it was right for its day. Both Moore 
and president Ruth Dyson, who is in some ways a paler version of 
'socialist' Margaret Wilson, said the future would build on Roger-
nomics, not un~do it. 
Half a moment's thought about the Labour Party's strategic and 
tactical options makes it clear it has no alternative to that course -just 
as the Bolger Government now has no credible option but to stick with 
the general Richardson economic line. To take the parallel a bit further, 
the Bolger Government can - and, to meet electoral and caucus 
management imperatives, must - clean up some of the economic and 
political excesses and sillinesses of the Richardson line. It can do that 
without abandoning the line. If it did U-tum (that is, go in the opposite 
direction, towards more regulation, substantial direct subsidies, printing 
money and so on) or veer heavily in any of those directions, its 
credibility, which is now confined to a wafer-thin argument that 
massive breach of promise was necessary to deal with crisis, would lose 
its last tenuous hold. 
Similarly, a mea culpa by a repentant and born-again regulatory 
Labour Party would be cause for much mirthless laughter in the 
electorate. Like National, Labour can now disown the excesses and 
sillinesses that accompanied rapid and often ideas-driven change. And, 
like National, it can do that credibly. But if it attempts to disown the 
market-liberal years, it will be irrelevant. Why toy with impostors when 
you can have the real thing in Jim Anderton? 
Which brings me to the import of this paper: the market liberals may 
be in eclipse in the rhetoric and the iconography; but in one sense they 
live on. Market-liberalism has survived the fourth Labour Government 
just as its anti-nuclear stance and its Treaty of Waitangi changes have. 
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That is not to say it will necessarily survive the stresses of the next 
half-decade or so. If major banks collapse in Japan; if the fragile 
American economy recidivises into deep twin deficits; if Western 
Europe is swamped by a catastrophe to its east: then the New Zealand 
economy will be denied the recovery market-liberalism was aimed at. 
Given the deep anger at both main parties for a combination of 
deteriorating outcomes, 'extreme' policies that don't exhibit care about 
people and breaches of promise, prolongation of recession could easily 
push us into a period of populism of the Winston Peters (or Mike 
Moore) sense. 
But in the meantime and in the longer tettll if the international 
economy holds and New Zealand's economy responds to that, the 
market-liberals have set the parameters to economic debate. A number 
of assumptions are now embedded: the economy must be relatively 
open; internal regulation must be limited; budget deficits must be within 
limits detern1ined by economic growth and debt must not grow; 
consequently resources for social services are limited; in any case, 
money does not equal solutions in social policy; the state should be 
managed efficiently and it should by and large not try to run busi-
nesses. In the mainstream of economic debate reimposition of heavy 
border protection or the pre-1984 tight web of internal controls, 
repurchase of fortrter state assets or massive state economic investment, 
recourse to large-scale deficit-financing of social services and a return 
to heavily progressive income taxation are off the agenda. 
An important indicator of that was the paper released by the Gamma 
Foundation, a centre-left think tank, on October 16. The Foundation's 
alternative to current Government economic policy would have read 
like dangerous market radicalism in 1984. 
The shift effected by the market-liberals will therefore fottil part of 
the background against which policy is henceforth developed. That does 
not mea~ an inexorable march to a market-libertarian economy. If 
anything, we will now see some judicious reinsertion of the state here 
and there in the economy. For one, the current cabinet is swinging 
round to a more pragmatic position that will be more responsive to 
public preference and interest group influence. More important for the 
long term, however, is the development of an intellectual counter-attack 
both abroad and, very recently - for example, the Gamma paper- here. 
If the Labour market-liberals are now in a sort of political purgatory, 
they will linger in spirit in one important sense: we are in for more 
change yet. Subject to tl_le caveat about populism above, that will be up 
to another technocratic elite to manage. 
But the market-liberals have left another legacy for the Labour Party. 
Their technocratic approach has devalued ideology and necessarily 
therefore devalued Labour ideology. I look forward to John Roberts' 
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inquiry later today as to whether there is an ideology now available to 
the party. I suspect not. 
Notes 
1. This paper represents first thoughts and is empirical rather than theoretical 
in basis. 
2. In passing I might debunk another bit of mythology misconceived by Bruce 
Jesson that I was an active member, or at least supporter, of the cabal. Jesson 
in various places has stated that I 'publicised' those arguing for 'new right' 
economic nostrums from the late 1970s. I did pay a lot of attention to the 
emergence of those ideas in political debate and expression, such that in 1982 
or 1983 Professor Robert Chapman remarked about me that I was 'looking for 
the revolution of the right'. As a journalist, I am bound to examine currents 
and to inquire where they might lead. At the same time as Jesson has supposed 
me to have been 'publicising' (that is, pushing as distinct from tracking or 
recording) the more-market ideas, I was also tracking and writing extensively 
about the rise of the liberal-left in the Labour Party organisation and about the 
rise of the Social Credit Political League and what it might represent (to such 
an extent that one senior Labour official inquired seriously whether I was a 
Social Crediter). By contrast, I did not in 1983-84 write much about the New 
Zealand Party, which I regarded as a movement, not a party, and therefore 
likely to have limited impact and a limited future; yet, if I was pushing, as 
distinct from tracking, the 'new right', I would surely have devoted more effort 
and space to 'publicising' that party. For the past couple of years I have been 
looking out for a credible political riposte to the dominance of market-obsessed 
policy approaches and now that it is beginning to emerge in a politically 
credible form in New Zealand I am tracking it. This does not, however, make 
me a 'publicist' of the 'new left'. 
3. See 'Coming Home', in Summer Book 2 (Wellington, 1983); Colin James, 
The Quiet Revolution (Wellington, 1986); Colin James et al., eds., The Election 
Book (Wellington, 1987); and Colin James & Alan McRobie, eds., Changes? 
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- and what about the 1990s? Public policy in the past decade', unpublished 
paper delivered at the Stout Centre, Victoria University of Wellington. 
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6. Interview, October 24, 1991. 
7. Interview, October 23, 1991. 
8. Interview, October 25, 1991. 
9. Hon R. 0. Douglas, Financial Statement, 18 June 1987, p. 1. 
10. Hon R. 0. Douglas, Speech to Canterbury Chamber of Commerce, March 
30 1988. 
11. Jonathan Boston, 'The Theoretical Underpinnings of Public Sector 
Restructuring in New Zealand', in Boston et al., eds., Reshaping the Stat.z. New 
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The Labour Party and the Treaty 
Tipene 0 'Regan 
Tena koutou, 
I intend to suggest a few ideas to you which are unlikely to cause 
umbrage but which may cause a little surprise. 
Before I do so I need to mark out my ground a little with a few 
perceptions which are now ordinary enough not to disturb you. 
Firstly, I largely concur with Mancur Olson and the view that nations 
and their structures age and become systemically dysfunctional, that 
they develop a variety of political Alzheimer's. I believe the New 
Zealand political system has a sickness of this kind and the character 
of our village politics makes it highly unlikely that the physician can 
effect a self-cure in what remains of my lifetime. 
Our political system has been overtaken - indeed completely 
outstripped - by its own demography (I refer to the twin demographic 
tides of aging and Maori), by world technological change, and the 
downstream effects of these two forces on political philosophy and 
economic perspective. 
The current tuttiloil in the world is not a victory for any system or 
political/economic model. The democracies harbour similar dis-
integrative tendencies to poor old Gorbachev's world, and it is my view 
that they will be manifesting it with a vengeance by the first quarter of 
the new century. I say this only to make the point that there is not very 
much exceptional about the state of village politics here. Generally only 
the timing is different. 
Secondly, I believe that the fundamental reason why we will fail to 
cure our system is that we suffer, almost joyfully, from any real sense 
of constitution - from any deep seated belief in the fundamentals that 
fortned us as a nation - from any belief that we need a code or tablet 
of principles with which to govern ourselves and to govern our politics. 
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Our resistance to electoral refortn, to a Bill of Rights, indeed to any 
fundamental break in the absurd notion of the absolute supremacy of 
Parliament, is evidence enough of this nation's ongoing stumble into 
the future night. 
Thirdly, I believe that there is a fundamental conflict between the 
Western egalitarian tradition and the manner in which that tradition has 
been given political expression and the rights of indigenous peoples and 
their cultures. 
The historic location of the indigenous peoples in the ranks of the 
disadvantaged has made for a marriage of convenience between them 
and the egalitarians of the Western liberal tradition. Because egalitarians 
tend to be somewhat casual about rights, they have tended to deal with 
disadvantaged minorities on a basis of needs, or at least on their own, 
generally majoritarian view of those needs. From this perspective, the 
notion that Maori Iwi might seek to own and manage their own 
economic base, is viewed with caution, if not hostility. From this 
viewpoint, the rightist philosophers of the 'level playing field' are 
merely a counterpoint to the 'flat earth' egalitarians. This observation 
could equally be made of the Coast Salish of British Columbia, by the 
Ainu in Japan or Maori in New Zealand. 
Since I was asked to speak to you I have encountered a paper written 
by one of my Honours students at Canterbury, Vincent O'Malley, on 
the Treaty record of the first Labour Government. I hope that his paper 
will not be long in being published and I acknowledge here a consider-
able stimulation from his provocative analysis. He draws heavily on 
what are now the conventional sources, such as Orange, Love, Kelly 
and Butterworth. However, what he has offered me that is different, is 
a view which suggests that the Labour Party has been, historically, not 
so much neglectful of the Treaty as such, but essentially hostile to it 
and that this hostility towards the notion of Maori Treaty Rights is in 
full accord with both Labour's egalitarian tradition and its adoption of 
the egalitarian colonialism which passes as Kiwi culture. He emphasises 
that Labour has always seen Maori issues in monocultural and narrowly 
economic tertns. 
In 1935 Savage reaffirtned the Labour Party's long-standing promise 
to Maori people of 'economic equality with racial individuality'. But 
the first Labour Government, like its successors, had little .-eal 
understanding of the depth of Maori desire to control their own destiny. 
'Racial individuality' has been reserved for political and ceremonial 
rhetoric. 
O'Malley shows that the underlying assumptions of Labour policy, 
some would say wishful thinking, included the belief that the Maori 
was 'dying out' and that the 'problem' would soon solve itself. But 
ever since 1896 and especially after World War ll, Maori health has 
30 Tipene 0 'Regan 
recovered dramatically despite a death rate several times that of non-
Maori. He argues that the early thrust of Labour Party policy, upon 
achieving office in the 1930s, was essentially segregationist and based 
on assumptions of a second class basically confined to rural areas -
developed from the foundation of Ngata's land development schemes. 
Interestingly, he shows that under Labour the emphasis shifted from 
the development of the Maori to that of the land - more and more 
marginal land. This undertnined the long-tertn viability of rural-based 
enterprise and avoided the real issue of purchasing Pakeha Land (i.e. 
good land) for Maori farmers. This reflects the merging of Labour 
egalitarianism with colonial egalitarianism. Maori were only marginally 
relevant to this process - an excuse for the general culture development 
model. 
The Social Security Act of 1938 provided the first statutory 
justification for paying Maori lower rates of benefit on the grounds that 
since they had a lower standard of living to begin with, they did not 
need the same level of support as the Pakeha. That Act was passed into 
law by a Labour Government. 
As Orange has shown in her excellent paper on the Maori War Effort 
Organisation, 1 the Labour establishment's resistance to Maori auton-
omy was firtn. When the Maori War Effort Organisation under Paikea 
began to assume notions of Maori autonomy and self-management in 
the post-World War II phase, the great egalitarians moved hard and 
fast. H. G. R. Mason and Fraser particularly, sabotaged the efforts to 
continue the Organisation with its emphasis on tribal structure as the 
basis for Maori organisation. The result was that the control of Maori 
affairs fell firtnly into the hands of the bureaucratic social engineers and 
effective 'flax roots' and lwi control of their own business was thereby 
prevented. 
In the 1930s the Party was quite happy to accept the Ratana thrust 
towards social equality at the same time as it neglected and deliberately 
avoided Ratana's focus on the Treaty. 
Right until the time when Koro Wetere became Minister of Maori 
Affairs, that situation persisted, despite ongoing and continual Maori 
resistance and protest. 
I put the proposition to you that Wetere and Palmer are the two 
primary revolutionaries of our recent political history and I believe that 
historians of the future will identify their twin contributions as probably 
the most important constitutional developments, in tertrls of Maori 
relationships with the power culture, that this country has seen since the 
mid-30s when the historic cleavage between the Ngata conservatives 
and Ratana proved so advantageous for the Labour cause. First I refer 
to Geoffrey Palmer. 
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With all the gangling naivete of the academic pondering first 
principles, Palmer turned Labour's for1nal attention towards the Treaty. 
I say 'fortnal' because it is a superb example of 'capture' of a position 
that few in the Party really cared much about. Labour concern in this 
area has been consistently held at the level of Waitangi Day, not being 
able to make up its mind whether it's New Zealand Day or actually 
marks the foundation of our constitution. 
My attention was first really engaged by the Palmer script when he 
built into Labour's Manifesto the decision to go beyond Matiu Rata's 
1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act and make it possible for the Tribunal to 
hear Treaty claims back to 1840. The fact that the Labour Party 
endorsed that kaupapa gave me much hope as it was a position Ngai 
Tabu had argued vigorously before select committees both in 1975 and 
subsequently. 
The fo1 tnal adoption of 1840 as a claims base was greeted in 
Parliament with enorir1ous criticism, particularly from Muldoon and his 
peers. However, it is worth noting that since the passage of the 
amending legislation in 1984, there has not been one single major 
political disturbance in New Zealand centred on the Treaty. When one 
considers the 'Februaries of our discontent' that preceded 1984, that in 
itself is an extraordinary achievement and says something about the 
significance of that legislative action. However, New Zealand still has 
to deliver on the promise of the Tribunal and the great test will be the 
extent to which our political system can cope with the achievement of 
durable settlements based on the findings of the Tribunal. 
Palmer however, with his concern with basic constitutional issues, 
focussed us in a way which we have not previously been in my 
lifetime, on the primary posts of our constitutional house. That he 
eventually failed with the Bill of Rights - a cause which I believe is yet 
to come- and a host of other fundamental refottns that he was bent on, 
is not important here. What is important is that the Labour Party 
fottnally moved itself in tertns of Maori relationships to a position 
based on Treaty rights and away from a position based on its previous 
egalitarian codes. Not that those codes were very well thought out 
anyhow, and they were certainly not effective. The total failure of the 
egalitarian codes to cope with the change in Maori demography is all 
about us. In education, crime, housing, on every index of social 
disadvantage, the policies which we have followed have demonstrated 
their inadequacy. We have actively created a wasteland, consistently 
ignoring the best international advice on the basis that we're doing 
better than the Australians. That was not so much what moved Palmer. 
It was intellectual rigour and a love of principle - a foreign element in 
the New Zealand political mix. 
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I refrain from dealing at length with the effects of that fonttalised 
policy position on legislative reference to the Treaty and the further 
consequential effect on the mind of the judiciary. The relationship 
between the High Court and Parliament balances on something of a 
tightrope. It is at the core of our constitutional conventions. Since 1985 
that tightrope has several times been acutely tensioned. Maori trust in 
the judiciary and legal system has been greatly strengthened by the 
manner in which the High Court and the Court of Appeal have 
conducted themselves. Given the gross lack of historical justification for 
Maori faith in the Courts that, in itself, is a remarkable transfortnation. 
There is reason to suspect that Palmer more than once perceived that 
transfor111ation somewhat ruefully. 
It is for his role in forn1alising Labour's position (and I do not 
believe it is a very strongly held forn1al position) that Geoffrey Palmer 
will come to be seen as one of the most revolutionary figures to have 
entered, and left, New Zealand Labour politics in our period. 
I turn now to Koro Wetere. He has been a person much chuckled 
over by politicians and press alike. To me though, Wetere has always 
been 'tuturu Maori' - not just linguistically and culturally competent in 
Maori, but reflecting an uncluttered understanding of the basis of the 
Maori position in political and cultural tertns. On a number of counts, 
he has proven to be, possibly, one of the most successful Ministers of 
Maori Affairs that this country has ever seen. Indeed, if the capacity to 
extract money from Cabinet is a sign of the success or otherwise of a 
Cabinet Minister, then Koro Wetere must rank as one of the most 
successful Cabinet Ministers in New Zealand history. 
More importantly, however, in my view, is the way Wetere fitted his 
policies on Maori economic development to the constitutional shift 
which had been engineered by Palmer. Wetere brought to Maori Labour 
politics strong Ratana credentials, matched with a pragmatic experience 
in lands and forestry and a canny political sense of where the basic 
Maori polity was moving. He focussed on Iwi development, a kaupapa 
with a clear whakapapa back to Paikea's Maori War Effort Organisation 
to which I have already referred. Indeed it has roots back through the 
19th century to the Treaty itself. 
In that model, the tribal communities themselves were to detetttrine 
their own directions and their own affairs and they were themselves to 
be the driving force of Maori policy: that is, things were not to be 
controlled from the centre. In the Wetere version, the only function of 
the centre was to provide resources through the so-called 'Devolution' 
policy enunciated in Te Urupare Rangapu. It should not be forgotten 
that the devolution principle was itself a very nice fit with the general 
policies being pursued by the New Right in Health, Local Government 
and other areas. From the Maori point of view, however, the important 
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thing about ~devolution was that it gave the Maori regional communities 
some considerable measure of authority over what 'mainstream' 
government agencies did in their particular worlds. 
The policy was, of course, severely constrained by the general 
unwillingness of the power culture to release control, particularly of the 
purse, and it would have to be said that devolution to Maori either 
largely failed or was prevented from being fulfilled. However, what did 
happen was that Maori tribal communities began to prepare themselves 
for the processes of devolution, and in particular for the Runanga lwi 
Act which was to provide a mechanism by which they could properly 
identify themselves and thus relate more appropriately to the Crown. 
What was important about the Runanga lwi Act however, was not its 
capacity to facilitate devolution, but the fact that it provided for the 
recognition of lwi, as such, as the Treaty Partners of the Crown and its 
agencies. This was, in itself, historic and earth-shattering stuff. One of 
the principal problems of the Treaty relationship is that in 1862 the 
Crown, by a series of Acts, effectively vaporised the legal personality 
of tribes. The kaupapa, recorded in Hansard as being stated by Henry 
Sewell, was 'to stamp out the beastly communism of the Maori'. The 
re-recognition of the legal personality of tribes, which was provided for 
in the Runanga lwi Act, provided, however briefly (remember that 
Winston Peters abolished it as his first Ministerial action) for the first 
time since 1862, a basis on which Maori Iwi could forn1ally relate to 
their constitutional Treaty partner. 
All this posed difficulties for the egalitarians and there were 
considerable limitations imposed by the Labour Cabinet on Wetere's 
ambitions in this regard. The total focus on issues of accountability for 
public funds - in marked contrast to the same consideration in respect 
of Pakeha institutions and organisations - provided pretty heavy 
constraints on the degree to which devolution could in fact occur. 
However, the concept of forrnal recognition and its method of 
achievement was a turning point and it may be that the Bill currently 
being negotiated between Ngai Tahu and the Crown, to achieve 
essentially the same thing and overcome Winston's somewhat careless 
abolition (focussed almost entirely on devolution) may be the beginning 
of a new turning point in the forn1al relationship rooted in the Treaty. 
The Waitangi Tribunal's 1991 supplementary Report on Ngai Tahu 
'legal personality' gives clear and unequivocal support to this view. 
Measured by today's standards, Labour's achievements seem modest 
but, seen in the context of previous state attitudes to Maori, they look 
distinctively more progressive and enlightened -especially in constitu-
tional and Treaty ter1ns. 
You might find my view of Palmer and Wetere as the real radical 
innovators of Labour hard to take. Douglas came and Douglas went. 
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Most of what he did was by way of purge - there was little beyond it. 
The architects of growth are yet to be found, their tools are yet to be 
discovered. 
Palmer and Wetere, however, actually altered the mainframe not 
merely of Labour, but of the most fundamental relationship in Aotearoa. 
When historians strip back the blanket of trivia which enshrouds our 
politics I believe my judgement will be confirtned. 
Note 
1. Claudia Orange, 'An Exercise in Maori Autonomy: The Rise and Demise 
of the Maori War Effort Organisation', New Zealand Journal of History, 
21 ( 1987), pp. 156-72. 
Women and the Labour Party 
Margaret Wilson 
Introduction 
Writing about women and the Labour Party is one of those topics that 
appears easy at first sight but proves extremely difficult once you begin 
the task of writing. The task is difficult because so little is written or 
recorded about the political contribution of women in New Zealand. 
There are interviews with individual women, and efforts have been 
made to record the experiences and memory of events of women who 
have been involved within the Party throughout its history. 1 Women 
rarely feature in any substantial way in the general histories of the Party 
because women have not held leadership roles until recently. And 
histories tend to concentrate on the 'great events' and 'leaders'. Also 
there has been no analysis of why so many women gave so much of 
their lives to work for the Labour Party, or what such political 
dedication has produced for them personally, and the achievement of 
the goals that first lead them into the Labour Party. 
New Zealand has no equivalent of Beatrix Campbell's The Iron 
T,adies, which addressed the question- why do women vote Tory?2 It 
looks at why a political tradition that has done so little for women has 
attracted not only women voters, but women who are active within the 
Party organisation. A similar question needs to be asked in New 
Zealand at the moment. Why do so many women support the National 
Party that is pursuing a policy to return women to their traditional role 
of the unpaid carer of the community? Do women really want to return 
to this role? I would argue that work needs to be done on both the 
National and Labour Parties in order to gain a greater understanding of 
why women become involved in politics and why they associate 
themselves with the political agendas of men from both the right and 
left. Today however I have been asked to concentrate on women in the 
Labour Party. 
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Traditional Roles 
In the past women in the Labour Party have suffered from the 
somewhat trite analysis that women's major political contribution was 
to keep their menfolk well prepared. Occasionally it is also mentioned 
that women were good fund raisers, but preferred the kitchen to the 
platfortn. It is true that some women were content with both these 
important roles, but I am yet to meet one of those so-called 
stereotypical Labour women who did not have a decided view on policy 
matters, the quality of the current leadership, and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Party organisation. I also know from experience 
how both those traditional roles of women are vastly under-rated by 
those who do not understand what keeps a political organisation 
together. 
I also found it ironic that the fundraising role was not more valued. 
I concluded that the importance of the 'raffle ticket and cake stall 
sellers' was underestimated because it maintained the organisational 
structure which was expected to be maintained by the faithful until the 
time for the big event which came every three years, namely the 
general election. At this time, the men took over because of course they 
know all about the running of major events. In my experience, some 
men are excellent organisers, but more women actually got the tasks 
done. This is a phenomenon I have observed in other institutions. Still 
the funding and organisation of the Labour Party are not the topics on 
which I have been asked to talk today. The general points I want to 
make are that while many women perforn1ed these traditional roles, 
they also aspired to the making of policy, the devising of political 
strategy, and the power to make decisions within the Party and within 
Parliament. The other point is that those traditional roles have always 
been underestimated by analysts when examining political parties, and 
therefore the role of women has remained hidden. 
The Questions - Past and Future 
When preparing for this conference, two questions kept recurring and 
demanding an answer. They were exactly why it took over 60 years for 
women to achieve leadership roles within the Labour Party, and 
secondly, whether women can still continue to rely on the Labour Party 
to achieve their political agendas. I shall not pretend that I have found 
the answer to the questions, but many of the thoughts expressed in this 
paper are related to them. The first question is important because I 
believe we can learn from our history. Personally I would have 
benefitted greatly from knowing of the struggles of the women who 
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went before me in the Party. It would have saved me a lot of time and 
energy an,d enabled me to more quickly w,ork out my priorities. Since 
success in politics relies as much on being opportunistic as being well 
prepared, a knowledge of past struggles enables you to seize the 
moment with more confidence. The second question is also important 
for me and other women because in these uncertain times we need to 
be very clear who is working in our best interests, and just as import-
antly, which organisation will enable us to work in our own best 
interests. Of the options available to us, that is, the two main parties, 
I would argue that on the record Labour has supported women who 
wish to fully participate in all aspects of life in the oommunity. 
Questions are obviously being raised about both main parties however 
as to what will be their futures. 
We are living in a time of political cynicism when it is easy to reject 
the familiar in search of that something new and ,different that will 
solve all our problems. This period of political instability is partially the 
fault of some powerful politicians (and it is far too easy to be powerful 
under the New Zealand electoral system), who have presumed to know 
what is good for the people. It is also due to the political immaturity of 
much of the population. A lack of knowledge or interest in the political 
process beyond self-interest, and an unrealistic expectation that 
democracy is the nortnal system of governance, have all contributed to 
the current crisis of confidence not only in government but particularly 
the two party system. 
IThe Party System Requestioned 
It is not surprising that the two party system is feeling the stress of the 
current political crisis. Both parties have their origins in coalitions of 
different but similar political interests. This has provided an internal 
tension within both parties. The successful mediation of internal 
differences is often a measure of the success of the party. This success 
depends both on the skills and willingness of the party members to 
compromise, and the economic, social and cultural climate of the time 
which determines the parameters within which compromise can be 
reached. The ability to compromise and adapt to change also depends 
on the internal organisational structure, and what may be tetnted the 
'culture' of the party. For example, is it tolerant of diversity and is it 
seen as a strength or weakness? Also how conflict is resolved internally 
is an indication of how it will be resolved within the community. 
It seems appropriate to me, during this time of questioning of the 
future effectiveness of the two main parties, to ask the more basic 
question of whether the whole concept of the party is the best method 
38 Margaret Wilson 
of political representation for us. At the moment I cannot see an 
alternative to a party system in some for111 if we wish to maintain a 
system of representative democracy. I can see however how the current 
democratic system as we know it is under threat. The principal threat 
coming from the current economic policy that is based on a premise 
that the state should be collapsed, and decisions made by the market, 
or more accurately, those few men who control the market. This 
efficiency approach to government soon leads to government by 'wise 
men' who are 'properly' qualified and equipped to run New Zealand 
Incorporated, which will be the holding company that provides the 
playing level and rules for the market players. I think that for all the 
criticisms of the party system, it is often useful to have a relook at it, 
if only to remind ourselves of the merits as well as the weaknesses of 
a particular system. 
The alternative to a no party system is of course a multiplicity of 
parties. I am not one who sees the answer to our present problems as 
lying only in the proliferation of political parties. I suspect the new 
parties once they emerge from the establishment phase, and after they 
acquired power, will show many of the same weaknesses of the current 
main parties. Leaders will be criticised for not consulting, and small 
cliques will take over often in the interests of just getting things done, 
as much as to impose a position on others. They will also break 
promises if they are brave enough to declare a policy that is more than 
a general ideological statement. The test of an effective political 
organisation for me is its ability to mediate between the various 
interests represented within it, to achieve sufficient consensus to enable 
decisions to be made and accepted. Although I do not see many 
political parties ultimately providing better representation for the 
people, I do believe that this multi-party phase is one through which 
our political system must go before a new consensus is achieved around 
two or maybe three major parties. 
Why Women Joined the Party 
The future of the party system and the fortn it takes are important 
issues for women. They fortn part of the assessment that women must 
make as to which political option will be the best for them. In the past 
women have been attracted to all political parties for a variety of 
reasons. Those women who originally joined and have continued to join 
the Labour Party have not been attracted just by its specific women's 
policy- this is a relatively recent development. They were attracted by 
its socialist, equalitarian vision, and its concern for the individual who 
had not benefited under a capitalist economic system. This comes 
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through clearly when you read their writings and, where available, 
interviews with the women themselves. They shared a concern for 
individuals, especially women and children, and a commitment to 
peace. They also believed that the strength of New Zealand society lay 
in people working together and not against each other, which was 
characteristic of the system of capitalism or what is now called a 
market economy. 
The choice of the Labour Party as a vehicle to work for change was 
a deliberate one for many women, who had belonged to other ·parties. 
This was especially true during the for111ation of the Party, when the 
women, like the men, had to choose whether they would support this 
new political initiative. Women had also had experience working 
through other community and women's organisations. Many had also 
been involved with local body politics. They therefore had considerable 
organisational and administrative experience which was seen at branch, 
LEC, and executive levels in the Party. It was also seen in women's 
determination to create a space within the Party for their own branches, 
conferences and policy decision making. 
While working within the general Party organisation, women from 
the beginning of the Party demanded the right to their o·wn 
organisational structure. This demand was not always met and was and 
remains under challenge. In many ways the organisational history of ~e 
relationship between women and the Party is one of constant struggle 
for the right to devise and direct their own political policy and strategy 
within an organisation that was hierarchical and designed for the 
comfort of men not women. I would argue that in the times women did 
achieve this right, the Party was more successful politically. This is 
certainly true of its recent history. 
I do not want today to give a narrative of women's political activity 
within the Party over the last 75 years. Such a narrative would be 
incomplete, and I do not have time to even attempt such a task. I have 
endeavoured instead to try and identify those matters that characterised 
the nature of women's involvement in the Party. Just as importantly I 
have tried to answer those questions I originally posed earlier in the 
paper, namely, why -it took women so long to achieve leadership 
positions, both personally and in policy matters, and whether the 
Labour Party remains a viable political organisation for women. 
Women Were There at the Beginning 
and Have Remained 
Women have been actively involved in the Labour Party since its 
foundation, which meant they were active within the various 
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organisations that combined to for111 the Labour Party in 1916. The first 
executive of the Party included two women, Elizabeth McCombs and 
Sarah Snow, who were re-elected to those positions at the first Annual 
Conference of the Party in 1917. The history of the involvement of 
women within the Party shows a series of peaks and troughs of activity 
and prominence of women. Not surprisingly in the early years, there 
was a great deal of interest which was followed by a falling off of 
involvement in the 1920s through to just before the election of the first 
Labour Government. The re-emergence of women in high profile 
positions was highlighted by the election of Elizabeth McCombs as the 
first Labour Member of Parliament in 1933. She was followed by 
Catherine Stewart in 1938, Mary Dreaver in 1941, Mabel Howard in 
1943, and lriaka Ratana in 1949. After this period women had to wait 
until 1967 before another Labour woman was elected to Parliament, 
when Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan was elected to the seat of Southern 
Maori. 
It is sometimes forgotten why it took women such a long time from 
receiving the right to vote to achieve the election of the first woman to 
Parliament. This was partially explained by the fact that women had to 
wait until 1919 before they obtained the right to stand for Parliament, 
and then only because New Zealand was in danger of falling behind 
other Commonwealth countries. It was therefore difficult for women to 
follow through and capitalise on their electoral breakthrough when they 
got the vote in 1893. Although women won the right to be elected in 
1919, the prejudice remained strong against women standing for 
Parliament. It was only by the detertnined efforts of women like Ellen 
Melville and Elizabeth McCombs that the breakthrough was made in 
1933. I can testify that the prejudice remained strong until an increasing 
number of women started to stand and be elected to Parliament from 
the 1970s onwards. I would predict however that if women decrease in 
influence within the Party organisation at decision making levels, then 
the number of women in Parliament will decline again. 
The peaks and troughs of women's activity within the Party appear 
to have roughly coincided with women holding or not holding 
leadership positions. After that spurt at the time of the establishment of 
the Party, the presence of women started to gradually decline until there 
was another surge in the early 1930s. This heralded another active 
period with several women being elected to Parliament and women 
being active at both organisational and policy making levels. The post-
war period saw a rapid decline of women's activity which lasted until 
the late 1960s. The 20 year period of decline was partially explained by 
the strong social pressure on women to give priority to the reproduction 
of the species. An account of this period is seen in Sonja Davies' book 
Bread and Roses.3 Although a few women were still active in the 
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Party, their struggle for recognition was a difficult one. The renewal of 
interest that carne with the rise of the women's movement in the late 
1960s, probably came just in time for the Labour Party. If it had n,ot 
responded to the needs of women during this period, it is difficult to 
see how it would have achieved electoral success in the 1980s. 
Several explanations can be given for the high and low periods of 
activity. There were the obvious pressures that came from the various 
roles women have had to play within their lives. The role of carer 
occupies more time in certain periods of women's lives, and the 
demands of this role are often inconsistent with the demands of public 
life that take no account of the needs of women. The influence of the 
depression and the war and the post-war period are also apparent in the 
cycles of activity.. Long periods in opposition can drain energy and 
interest also. I am certain that a closer review of New Zealan,d's social 
history would provide reasons for the level of women's political 
involvement at particular times. 
A Space of Her Own 
It is also apparent from reading the available material that women's 
involvement depended to a large extent on the Party's willingness to 
allow women to organise their own political structures and activities 
within the Party. From the foundation of the Party, women sought the 
right to have women-only branches, conferences, and policy. It is also 
apparent that this right has been continuously challenged and for a long 
period the right to hold women's conferences was forbidden. Various 
explanations can be given for this attitude. The arguments, as I recall, 
nortnally focussed on the need for 'unity', that is, there should be only 
one way of doing things and that way always seemed to be what the 
men felt most comfortable with. This argument seemed based not so 
much on the necessary political principle that action is more effective 
when there is unity and not division, but more on some fear of what the 
women might be doing by themselves, and a need for conformity that 
was male-centred, hierarchical and authoritarian. The other more 
understandable objection to women's branches lay in the inability of the 
Party leadership to be able to control the women's votes at meetings 
and conferences. I understood this reason better than the other, but 
obviously did not agree that it justified the rigid control of women-only 
political activity. 
You can only admire the number of times women in the Party 
challenged the leadership while continuing to work within an 
organisational structure that did not appear to encourage the participa-
tion of women within the Party. This struggle is not only historical, 
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however. During my active involvement with the Party there was a 
persistent challenge through conference remits to the right of women to 
have their own branches, conferences and policy-making process. While 
these challenges were repelled during this period, they had the effect of 
draining women's energy and detracting from their ability to pursue 
their and the Party's political agenda. For some women, this battle 
became a pointless one and they left. It was often difficult to justify the 
amount of time and energy that goes into internal disputes. Sometimes 
important points of principle were the issue, but often it seemed to be 
a clash of personalities. Politics is a combative activity so this should 
not be surprising. For many women however - and many men - it was 
pointless and detracted from what, for them, was the real business of 
politics - the development and implementation of ideas. 
Why the Labour Party? 
This raises the question of why women bothered to remain within the 
Party when there was so much opposition. The answer to this question 
may be as varied as the number of women who work actively within 
the Party, or any political Party. I shall suggest a few reasons that are 
based on what we know of our history and my own personal experi-
ence. The first reason for my own continuing involvement was a very 
pragmatic one. The Labour Party was the only viable political option 
open to women who wished to seek change within the foreseeable 
future. It was viable because of its history and record of the way in 
which it had attempted to address the needs of women. This record was 
no doubt due to the efforts of women and the men who supported them 
who struggled in the past. In other words those women gave hope that 
it was possible to seek change through this process. 
The second and most important reason was that the Labour Party 
supported a policy of equality for women, which provided an ideologi-
cal basis from which to develop a women's policy that addressed the 
needs of women today. Philosophically and ideologically the Labour 
Party supported the best policy ideas for women who wished to fully 
participate in both the private and public arenas. The women's policy 
at the 1984 election expressed the women's agenda best. It was a 
coherent comprehensive programme for change based on the equality 
of women and recognition of their right to self detetttlination. Within 
that policy, one can see the continuation of the issues raised by the 
Labour women of the past. All aspects of women's lives were covered 
- economic, social, cultural, legal and political. The policy also 
addressed the problem of implementation of the policy and recom-
mended the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs. 
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The ir~ony was of course that while this policy was being developed 
and fought for through the various Party forums, the change to a market 
driven economic policy was also being developed. The two policies are 
inherently contradictory, which was recognised at the time. The women 
however were not prepared to defer to the men driving the economic 
policy for the sake of Party unity. A unity based on one group being 
constantly subordinate to another dominant group, is a unity without 
strength as was subsequently shown. I am pleased to see that the Party 
is developing a less extremist and more culturally appropriate econ~omic 
policy, while the women's policy remains substantially the same. 
I suspect that there was another reason why women continued their 
struggle within the Labour Party, even though it may have seem~ed 
unrewarding at times. That reason was that women found the experi-
ences and challenges they encountered through their political involve-
ment contributed to their own personal growth and enabled them to 
acquire skills and experiences that would not otherwise have been 
available to them. In other words, not all the experiences were negative, 
many were positive. Women were also empowered through their 
political involvement. Involvement in the political decision-making 
process at any level gives an insight into how the decisions that affect 
our lives are made and by whom. How such knowledge and 
empowern1ent is used politically will depend on the individual woman 
or man. In my experience most women and men used it to pursue their 
policy objectives, which after all is the whole point of political activity. 
Skills and experiences acquired through the Labour Party were also 
used by women in their activities outside the Party. I saw many women 
grow in confidence during their period of involvement with the Party, 
and subsequently use that experience positively in their employment 
and personal lives. 
It is Possible to Effect Change 
I wanted to conclude this paper on a positive note because in this 
country's current traumatised state, it is very easy to feel all political 
activity is futile. This is because at the moment the real decisions are 
made by a few people in the executive. There is a sense of 
powerlessness as you watch your life being fundamentally changed 
without your consent or involvement. In being positive, however, I do 
not want to fall into the trap of the ever-increasing number of motiv-
ationalists (the current plague we must endure) who seem to say that 
our problems are all within ourselves. All we need to do is think 
positive and all will 'be well. It will not. It is possible to work for 
political change, however, and to see results for that work. In many 
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ways that is the lesson of the history of the Labour Party. As a Party 
of refotti1 and change, it has had the task of enduring long periods in 
the political wilderness followed by brief periods of power at times of 
crisis. What has sustained the Party as a viable nationwide political 
organisation has been the values it expresses and its ability to produce 
the organisation to implement those ideas into practice. 
In order to illustrate this point, I thought it might be relevant to share 
with you the role women played in the renewal of the Labour Party 
during the 1970s. The story began in the 1960s when a group of 
Labour Party women renewed the campaign to fortn the Labour 
Women's Council within the Party as a central forum through which 
women could organise politically and develop a policy agenda which 
it could take to the people. It was a time of transition within the 
leadership of the Party and a time when it was commonly felt that the 
Party had yet again lost its way and had no policy ideas to offer the 
people. The women knew the needs of the women in their communities 
and were detertnined to make the Party acknowledge that need because 
they recognised that this was the type of policy initiative that women 
in the community wanted. This was a time of questioning of the 
traditional roles of women, and a time when women were moving to 
change those roles. If women were to be able to continue this change, 
they needed political support to change restrictive laws, and provide the 
resources for the rape crisis centres, improved health care, better 
educational and job opportunities, and to fund the refuges. Since 
nobody else was likely to help women but themselves, it was necessary 
for them to become politically active to make progress. 
It was during this period that I was seeking the answers to such 
questions as why the system seemed to advantage some and disadvan-
tage others, and whether it was possible for women to live and work 
outside the traditional societal role that appeared to be assigned to them 
without their consent. I was also looking for ways to change the system 
as many young people were at that time, unlike today. I worked with 
many women's organisations that pursued single issues - equal pay, 
equal employment opportunities, rape reforn1, fairer abortion laws, a 
non-nuclear New Zealand, etc. I noted that while we were frequently 
successful at raising public awareness of an issue, it tended to flounder 
on the rocks of Wellington before any real change happened. The 
limitations and frustrations of single issue politics was well illustrated 
for me in the campaign for fairer abortion laws. It was an excellent 
demonstration of political power. The lesson to be learnt was obvious. 
Unless you have that power, it can and will be exercised against you. 
In many ways the Muldoon National Government was the best 
recruiting tool for the Labour Party during the 1970s. 
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While I then acknowledged the importance of single issue 
organisations and campaigns, I could also see their limitations. The 
same was true of my experience within the trade union movement to 
protect the rights of women workers. The fact was however that many 
men saw women workers as a threat to themselves and gave limited 
support to women workers. The lack of women in leadership positions 
made it hard and difficult territory for women, yet progress started to 
be made during the 1970s as the movement slowly started to change in 
response to the changes in the labour market and social conditions 
generally. The campaign for endorsement of the Working Women's 
Charter highlighted for me the strengths and limitations of working 
through the trade union movement for the rights of women. Opposition 
to part-time workers and the right of women to control their own bodies 
accurately portrayed the prevailing attitude of men to women at that 
time. The Charter campaign was successful however in hastening the 
process of education and change. 
On any analysis at the time, then, it seemed to me that the most 
effective way to work for change in the medium terttl was to work 
through the Labour Party organisation. It was a somewhat unpromising 
vehicle on which to drive through the changes required when I became 
active in 1976. The 1975 election had been lost and there was a feeling 
of betrayal that the electorate had sold its soul on the promise of a 
superannuation scheme that was based on short tertn greed and long 
tetttl pain. There was also a need for a thorough reorganisation of all 
the Party's administrative and organisational structure. There was also 
a need for new organisational leadership. I was encouraged to perse-
vere, however, because of the presence of a few excellent women who 
worked tirelessly for change. While I involved myself in branch 
activities and local body elections, my main centre of activity was the 
women's section of the Party. 
The Labour Women's Council had been endorsed by the 1974 
Conference and started life at the 1975 Conference. Without this 
structure, I doubt if I would have found enough positive activity to 
maintain my commitment at that time. The strategy established by the 
women of the Party during the 1970s and early 1980s was quite simple. 
It involved two aspects. The first was to encourage women into 
positions of decision making within the Party organisation and to stand 
for Parliament. The second aspect of the strategy was to develop a 
policy for women that would be accepted by the Party as part of the 
Manifesto. It was assumed that with such a policy in the Manifesto 
there was a chance that it would be implemented once Labour became 
the government. These two strategies were developed together because 
it was important never to forget the purpose of political power was not 
only increased personal power, but the implementation of policy. Policy 
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was very important and a great deal of energy went into its develop-
ment before it emerged in the 1984 Election Manifesto. 
There is not time to detail precisely how the women of the Party 
gradually won positions on the executive, the Policy Council, and the 
all important selection committees. What must be said is that none of 
this development was an accident. It was planned and carried out 
through the democratic processes of the Party. This meant a lot of 
lobbying of other sections in the Party, several demonstrations of voting 
power in conferences, compromises, promises of support in exchange 
for votes, and all the nottnal tactics used in politics within any 
organisation. It also meant attracting, promoting, supporting, and 
generally assisting competent women to be involved politically. This 
was not easy for many had other commitments. 
The single most important factor throughout this period was the 
ability of the women to work through their own structures. The 
Women's Conference which was held before the Annual Conference 
was open to all women who were financial members of the Party. There 
was no delegate system, and all women elected to the Labour Women's 
Council were voted there by all the women present. The appointment 
of a women's organiser to deal with the women's section of the Party 
was a major factor in maintaining the effectiveness of that section. 
Without that position, it would have been impossible for the network 
to have been developed so quickly and so well. The appointment of the 
women's organiser was one of the undertakings Jim Anderton gave to 
secure the women's vote for his election as President. It was an 
undertaking he gave and honoured, though there was opposition at the 
time. 
While the women were developing their influence within the 
organisational and parliamentary wings of the Party, they also worked 
on the policy. Once again the use of separate forums for the develop-
ment of the policy before it was debated in the Policy Council was vital 
for the survival of ideas through the various committees into the 
Manifesto. An initiative that was taken during this period was the 
Women's Policy Conference. This was held between elections and was 
used to raise ideas, which were then refined through committees and 
sending copies of the proposals to women in the Party for comment and 
decision. It was the responsibility of the women's representative on the 
Policy Council to see that the policy survived relatively intact. This 
would have been an impossible task if it had not been for the presence 
of other women on the Policy Council who could carry the argument, 
second the motions, and generally trade their way through the tortuous 
but necessary process. 
The key then was for women to organise themselves, but when they 
engaged with the general Party organisation, then there were women 
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ready and willing to assist with the agenda at the next leveL For won1en 
to be effective they had to be everywhere all the time. Although the 
separateness of women was criticised, I argued that ultimately the Party 
would benefit as a whole. It benefited from the increased active 
membership, and it benefited at the ballot box. The women's strategy 
was based on the assumption that if women produced a policy relevant 
to women, and had women in positions of authority to implement the 
policy, then more women in the electorate would support that policy 
and those women, and assist with the election of the Party. It was 
commonly assumed that more women voted conservatively, and there 
does seem to be some evidence for this, though little work had been 
done prior to the 1980s and the advent of the aggressive use of opinion 
polls. 
This strategy to attract women voters was tested in the 1984 election 
and the results indicated that for the first time Labour attracted more 
women than National. The 1984 election also saw the election of 10 
Labour women to Parliament. This was a greater number than ever 
before and was soon followed by another first when two women were 
elected to the Cabinet. It appeared that women had achieved a foothold 
within Parliament from which to launch their policy. It also appeared 
that the women of the Party had proved that their argument for greater 
control over their own affairs had produced the intended outcome - the 
electoral success of the Labour Party. Of course the women's strategy 
was not solely responsible, but it had contributed in an obvious and 
major way. Unfortunately this experience counted for little once the 
Party became government. The lesson learnt by the Party in the 1970s 
and early 1980s was not learnt by the Parliamentary Party. 
There is not time to explore the details of the deterioration of the 
relationship and the slow but steady loss of support that took place over 
the six years of the Fourth Labour Government. From the outset it was 
a struggle between two very different ideologies. The dominant group, 
centred around the Minister of Finance in the executive, had detern1ined 
that New Zealand's future lay with a market economy. The women of 
the Party had detertnined that in order for women to develop towards 
full equality the state needed to play an active role in redressing the 
imbalance of power between the sexes. The Economic Summit 
Conference was the first clear signal for me that this was going to be 
a very difficult battle for women and that ultimately we could not win 
because we did not have power where it counted, in the executive and 
to a lesser extent in the bureaucracy. 
This insight did not mean, however, that women should give up. 
There was much to be learnt from the experience and along the way it 
would be possible to negotiate some changes. This is the strategy that 
was then followed and some gains were made that were and remain 
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important. The Ministry of Women's Affairs was established and after 
a shaky beginning has now started to produce the quality policy work 
that was originally intended. The rape laws were refor111ed and 
demonstrated what all women knew - that the law is only part of the 
problem. Women's initiatives were supported in health and education, 
especially in the area of early childhood education. Women were also 
appointed in greater number to public bodies which enabled some 
women to gain a further insight into how power operated at different 
levels. It also gave those bodies an opportunity to learn from the 
experience of women. 
I do not want to give a catalogue of Labour's achievements in the 
women's policy area. That has been done elsewhere and I am reminded 
of them regularly as those initiatives are abolished by the National 
Government who are pursuing a very different women's policy. They 
seem to believe that the market will deliver equality, justice and 
fairness to women. We wait to see if the result of this experiment is 
any different from such approaches in the 19th century. The final point 
I wanted to make was that while under Labour women managed to 
negotiate some changes and avoid open conflict for a period of time, 
the inevitable showdown came over the employment equity issue. This 
was the issue that directly challenged the market economic approach. 
The legislation would not have been successful if the Minister of 
Finance and his supporters had remained the dominant group in the 
executive. Their removal cleared the way for women to start to achieve 
economic fairness. Unfortunately however because of the damage in the 
community, the Labour Government had lost the trust of the people and 
regardless of its achievements they were voted out of office. 
For women one of the lessons is clear. If you do not have power you 
will be subject to the will of others. The experience ,of Labour women 
over the past 20 years is that it is possible to achieve power but it takes 
time and a great deal of commitment. This is the same for those men 
who enter politics. They have advantages but women, if they can 
maintain the ability to organise themselves, can also influence political 
decision-making. There is no magic to the process. You work the 
system and you have realistic time frames. However you must be 
persistent and consistent in the struggle. An ability to be adaptable and 
opportunistic also helps. 
Conclusion 
I have of course not answered the questions that I posed for myself in 
this paper. However, I hope I have provided some insights into how 
they can be answered. It took women so long to achieve power because 
• 
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the nortttal societal prejudices against women participating in public life 
influenced the men and the women who worked in the Party. The Party 
itself reflected these prejudices by not giving women that space of their 
own in which to work for the common objective. As attitudes changed 
so did the Party, but only because women made it change. They created 
their own space. As to whether the Labour Party still remains a viable 
vehicle for women, I can see no reason why not. It has the supportive 
general ideological position, and it still has a nationwide political 
organisation that is capable of winning elections. It is really a question 
of whether the Party is prepared to continue down the road paved by 
the women, and whether women are prepared to work within it. At the 
moment politics is not the career you would recommend to your 
children but it is an important task. If it is not done well we all suffer 
the consequences. 
I must conclude by stating that for all the frustrations and difficulties, 
I do not regret the time I spent working within the Labour Party. It 
provided me with opportunities to understand the political system in 
this country in a way that the university could not. It also gave me the 
opportunity to develop and test skills that had not been possible 
anywhere else. I learnt more in those few years than I ever imagined 
was possible to learn. I just hope other women take up the opportunity. 
If they do not then women and the country will be the poorer for not 
having the benefit of women in political decision-making. 
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Sore Labour's Bath? The Paradox of 
Party Identification in New Zealand 
Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts 
Introduction 
In Macbeth Shakespeare describes sleep as 'sore labour's bath.' 1 This 
is not to suggest that Labour's path back to power is necessarily for the 
Party and its leadership to sleep for three years: although - if National 
MP Winston Peters is to be believed - that was the strategy pursued by 
National when it was in opposition. In any case, using only three words 
of simple but colourful imagery, the playwright was able effectively to 
invoke a picture of a work-weary body being lowered slowly into an 
invigorating, soothing tub of hot water. 
There can be no doubts, too, that the body of the New Zealand 
Labour Party has been battered and bruised. In 1990 the party was 
unceremoniously dumped from office by the largest anti-government 
swing since 1935. At 35.1 per cent, Labour's share of the poll was the 
lowest it had received in any general election in New Zealand for sixty 
years, and - as a result - the Labour Party, with only 29 Members of 
Parliament, now has fewer MPs than at any time since 1931 (when only 
24 Labour MPs were elected to an 80-seat House). Membership of the 
party has also been estimated to be at a post-war low. 
The Labour Party is obviously in need of the healing, restorative 
powers of a long hot bath. And it is the argument of this chapter that 
a thorough review of the phenomenon of party identification in New 
Zealand contains some surprising but generally comforting findings for 
the Labour Party. 
Party Identification in New Zealand 
Although 'party identification' is one of the most important concepts 
used in analysing voting behaviour not only in New Zealand but in 
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other democratic societies as well,2 it can be regarded at the same time 
as a somewhat nebulous, even metaphysical, idea. As an attitude, it is 
most readily measure.d by survey research, as interviewers elicit 
responses to questions about people's feelings towards particular parties. 
Despite its apparent clarity of focus, however - involving the fairly 
simple and evidently attainable goal of detern1ining whether a person 
'identifies' with a political party and, if so, which one - there are 
difficulties in elucidating the meaning of any emotional links respon-
dents may claim to possess. 
A dictionary definition of 'identify', for instance., describes the word 
as (among other things) 'to connect or associate closely' and even 'to 
understand and share another's feelings'. Several words higher up on 
the same page, as it happens, is the word 'idealize', defined as 'to 
regard ... as perfect or more nearly perfect than is true. ' 3 There is little 
doubt that, for many, the capacity to identify strongly with a party or 
its leadership requires an effort at idealization which, increasingly, 
fewer people are able or inclined to make. On the other hand, those 
with a grievance against the party with which they nonetheless identify, 
but momentarily oppose, may perhaps be regarded as carrying two 
images of the party around in their heads: one, as it is; the other, the 
more idealized image, as they believe it ought more authentically to be. 
In any case, a close connection or association with the party with 
whom one identifies is generally not sufficient in New Zealand for 
people actually to join the organisation, participate in its activities or 
attend its meetings. Moreover, successive elections have demonstrated 
that understanding a party's outlook, and sharing its candidates' feelings 
-their desire to avoid defeat, for instance! - seems on the evidence to 
have become a fairly weak barrier among some party identifiers quite 
comfortable about voting for opposition parties or sitting out the elec-
tion altogether. 
There are therefore apparent discrepancies between the way in which 
people describe themselves- how they feel about themselves, political-
ly - and the way they may appear using strictly behavioural criteria. 
Figure 1, for example, which summarises responses to a survey 
question on party membership which was used over the 1972-84 period 
and in 1990,4 shows that most people in New Zealand possess no 
formal link to any political party. 
The absence of such affiliations sits side by side with a quite durable 
system of essentially two-party competition for government office . At 
general elections held since 1935 the two major political parties in New 
Zealand, Labour and National, together have acquired between 99.8 per 
cent and 77.8 per cent of the vote. Thus despite interesting and at times 
influential minor party participation in New Zealand's electoral process, 
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Figure 1: Political Party Membership in New Zealand, 1972-84 
and 1990 
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a reasonably stable pattern has developed in which two dominant catch-
all parties have alternated in government for nearly six decades. 
It would be surprising if such a development were not in some way 
associated with some fairly important bonds between New Zealand 
electors and the parties seeking both to represent and to govern them. 
One survey question which has been used in an attempt to study those 
bonds - to discover more precise infottttation about their existence, 
strength and behavioural implications - asks participants a fairly 
straightforward question, common in overseas as well as in New 
Zealand research: 'Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself 
as National, Labour, [various third parties, which have changed over the 
years], Independent, or what?' 
A summary of the responses given to this question from 1972 
through to 1987 is contained in Figure 2. 
The most striking feature of this Figure is that in each of these six 
elections, more people identified with the National Party than with 
Labour. This finding becomes even more significant, and at the same 
time somewhat paradoxical - hence the title of this article - when one 
recalls that Labour actually won three of these general elections (in 
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FlGURE 2: Party Identification in New Zealand, 1972 to 1987 
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1972, 1984 and 1987), gaining a plurality of votes cast nationwide and 
a majority of seats in the House. 
In two of the other elections, moreover- in 1978 and 1981 - Labour 
actually won more votes than National despite failing to win office. The 
only election of these six in which National gained more votes than 
Labour was 1975 - and yet the data are clear: Labour always lagged 
behind the National Party in terms of identification and, perhaps m~ost 
surprisingly of all, most noticeably so in 1984 when Labour nonetheless 
had one of its grander election victories. 
Figure 2 also shows a fairly steady decline in identification with the 
Labour Party over a 12 year period, from 1972 until 1984. (Although 
the Labour Party recovered ground slightly in 1981, the downward 
trend was reaffirtned in 1984 despite the Labour win that year.) In 
1987, however, following three years of Lange-Douglas government 
(now remembered with some n1isgivings by party activists), Labour 
Party identification rose five percentage points from the level it had 
attained in 1984. 
At that time, it was claimed that the fourth Labour government had 
radically transfortned not only New Zealand society, for better or 
worse, but its own image as welL No longer, it was argued, could 
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Labour be characterised simply as 'a party of the Left', as the party -
or, at the very least, the government - had ostensibly turned its back on 
state intervention. Labour had now become the party of financial 
deregulation and free-market policies. As a result, the decline in 
identification with Labour's fate and fortunes was arrested, at least 
momentarily, by new identifiers being brought in to the Labour fold. 
Just as the fourth Labour government had rewritten some of the rules 
of New Zealand politics, government, and public sector administration, 
so too was it possible to suggest that Labour had emerged from the 
process of restructuring with a new identity and a somewhat different 
group of identifiers. 
During the first four elections under the microscope in this paper -
1972 through 1981 - the proportion of the electorate who said that they 
had no party identification was not terribly great. At a time when many 
argued that there was increasing cynicism and distrust of politics (and 
politicians) in New Zealand- words heard more recently as well - the 
proportion of people outside the broad party net was remarkably small. 
Indeed, the proportion who said that they had no party identification at 
all declined slowly but noticeably over the 1972-81 period. 
This began to change in 1984, however. As Figure 2 shows, the 1984 
general election saw a rise in the percentage of people who did not 
identify with any New Zealand political party (in 1984 at just under 17 
per cent, the figure was the highest on the graph for 'no party identific-
ation' at that stage), and the proportion rose still further three years 
later. 
This loosening of party ties seems to be yet another instance of a 
much-noted phenomenon, a time lag in the arrival in New Zealand of 
social and cultural changes which have occurred overseas some years 
earlier. Many other democratic countries, in Europe and in North 
America, have witnessed a comparable weakening of the bond between 
party and self (which is one definition of party identification). In New 
Zealand the nexus with the established parties also appears to be 
weakening, in the wake of policy shifts and disappointments of various 
kinds, yet this still remains a process with a long way to go. To tum 
the statistics for those without party identification on their head, even 
in 1987 more than four out of every five New Zealand electors 
voluntarily described themselves as identifying with one or other 
political party. This is a very high figure and, despite some fluctuations, 
it has remained remarkably stable throughout the two decades under 
examination. 
Of course not everyone identifying with a particular political party 
does so with the same degree of enthusiasm. A follow-up survey 
question, used throughout this period, asked, 'Well, how strongly 
[Labour, or National, etc.] do you feel: very strongly, fairly strongly, 
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Figure 3: The Strength of Labour Party Identification, 1972 to 
1987 
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or not very strongly?' The strength of the party identification of Labour 
identifiers for the period from 1972 to 1987 is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Of the Labour Party's identifiers, the largest group of 'not very 
strong' identifiers was not unexpectedly found in 1975- on the eve of 
the massive defeat of the third Labour government. The smallest 
proportions of not very strong identifiers in these six elections were 
found in 1978 and 1984 - both of which were elections in which there 
were large swings to the Labour Party. Significantly for Labour, and 
consistent with these findings, the proportion of very strong identifiers 
was greatest in those two elections - once again reflecting the swings 
to Labour in those years. 
Despite the rise in the proportion identifying with Labour in 1987, 
as summarised in Figure 2, Figure 3 shows a drop in the proportion of 
'very strong' identifiers and a corresponding rise in the proportion of 
'not very strong' identifiers with Labour from 1984 to 1987. These data 
are indicative not only of the difficulties experienced by the Labour 
Party in coping with responses to some of the Labour government's 
economic policies - and to the entire ethos embraced by the term 
'Rogemomics, - but also to something which has received much less 
attention: namely, the problems experienced by persons unable to divest 
themselves of what may have been at times quite important emotional 
bonds to Labour yet equally unable to surrender their feelings of 
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dismay and disappointment over what was being done in their party's 
name. 
By way of contrast, Figure 4 provides data collected with respect to 
the National Party. This Figure shows that, just as when Labour won 
so convincingly in 1984, the scent of victory aids party identification. 
In 1975, 34 per cent of National Party identifiers felt very strongly 
about their identification. This was a considerably higher figure among 
National identifiers than for any other general election in the 1972-87 
period. Comparison of the two Figures shows that Labour Party 
identifiers - although (as shown in Figure 2) less well represented 
throughout the electorate as a whole - often had notably higher 
proportions of 'very strong' identifiers than did the National Party. 
Indeed, even in 1975, when National's fortunes peaked- at least until 
1990 - and Labour was at its low ebb - again, until 1990 - a slightly 
greater proportion of Labour identifiers were 'very strong' identifiers 
than was the case with National identifiers. (The figures are 34.3 per 
cent as against 34.0 per cent for National.) To sum up at this stage, 
therefore: a comparison between Labour and National shows that in 
every election between 1972 and 1987 Labour has had a higher propor-
tion of very strong party identifiers than has National.6 
Figure 4: The Strength of National Party Identification, 1972 to 
1987 
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The consequences for New Zealand politics of this ~difference 
between Labour and National are important. Although the National 
Party has a broader base of sympathy in the electorate than does 
Labour, and National thus starts slightly out in front so far as the 
electoral race is concerned, Labour evens the stakes considerably by 
having a higher proportion of very strong identifiers. The National 
Party's inbuilt advantage in ter1r1s of sheer numbers of identifiers is not 
sufficient to ensure electoral victory. As noted earlier, despite the fact 
that National is the dominant party in terttls of party identification in 
New Zealand, it has managed to win more votes than Labour through-
out the country as a whole on only two occasions (1975 and 1990) 
since the end of the 1960s. 
This rough equality in the electoral stakes - so far as handicaps go 
for Labour and National - is accentuated when 'fairly strong' party 
identifiers are examined. The proportions of fairly strong identifiers for 
both Labour and National are almost identical on an election by 
election basis for the period 1975 to 1987. Fairly strong identifiers are 
important for any political party. While they may not be the shock 
troops of party support, fairly strong identifiers are people whom the 
parties can - with decent marketing and presentation - h~ope to capture 
in significant numbers. Fairly strong identifiers cannot be taken for 
granted, but with some work they should be there for the taking by 
their own political party organisations. 
One consequence of the fact that Labour and National had remarkab-
ly similar proportions of fairly strong party identifiers at each of the 
elections during the period from 1975 to 1987 is that National has thus 
had a larger proportion of 'not very strong' party identifiers than 
Labour at each of these elections. Given the fact that the middle of the 
columns in Figures 3 and 4 is of roughly equal size for both Labour 
and National, and given the fact that Labour consistently had a 
somewhat higher proportion of very strong identifiers than National, 
then it stands to reason that National must, in tum, have had a higher 
proportion of 'not very strong' identifiers; and this is indeed the case, 
as the two Figures show. 
This seems an important clue to an explanation of an irony, or 
paradox, of New Zealand politics, restated here more comprehensively 
than earlier: namely, National's having lost so many times (in terms of 
votes) when so high a proportion of New Zealanders identify with the 
two parties and when, of the two, National has consistently had the 
higher share of party identifiers. One of the answers lies in the fact that 
National's identifiers have- on balance- been weaker than Labour's. 
A criticism sometimes levelled against the concept of party identifi-
cation is that ordinary electors in the street can see it as the same thing 
as voting. According to this view, a person interviewed in an election-
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Figure 5: The Loyalty of Major Party Identifiers, 1972 to 1987 
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time survey will report a party identification identical to their intended 
vote. If this were so, however, then National would have won every 
election from 1972 to 1990. All the people who reported thinking of 
themselves as National should have trooped loyally to the polls and cast 
their votes for the National Party. Likewise, Labour identification and 
voting should have gone together. As the Labour Party has consistently 
had fewer identifiers than the National Party, Labour would have been 
doomed to near-pertnanent minority status in New Zealand politics, at 
least in the absence of a major and - in the circumstances - somewhat 
sensational realignment of the country's parties or the introduction of 
a new electoral system. 
That Labour has managed to avoid that fate confittns that the two 
phenomena - party identification and voting choice - are not inter-
changeable. As there is a distinction between party identification and 
voting behaviour, it was possible for Labour to outpoll National in five 
of six elections between 1972 and 1987, in part because a considerable 
proportion of persons usually voting National have not been entirely 
loyal to the party with which they generally identify. This question of 
party loyalty is worth exploring in some detail. 
Figure 5, which charts major party loyalty, shows that on only one 
occasion during the period from 1972 to 1987 - in 1984 - has any set 
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of major party identifiers (in that case, Labour's) given more than 90 
per cent of their votes to the party with which they say they identify. 
Looking across the bar graph in Figure 5, it can be seen that usually 
only about four out of very five party identifiers vote for the party with 
which they claim some sort of bond. In other words, about 20 per cent 
of those who identify themselves with one or other of the major parties 
do not at the same time vote for that party in the general election held 
closest to the survey. There is of course a correspondence between a 
party's fortunes and the proportion of its identifiers that it can retain as 
voters. In Figure 5, the highest column for the National Party is in 
1975, when it retained the loyalty of more than 85 per cent of its 
identifiers and swept the third Labour government from office. 
Likewise, Labour's loyalty rate is highest in 1984 when it finally ousted 
the third National government from power. At the opposite end of the 
scale, Labour's loyalty rate - its ability to retain party identifiers as 
voters- was lowest in 1975 when it fell below 80 per cent for the only 
time during the 1970s and 1980s. The National Party's overall loyalty 
rate is somewhat lower than the Labour Party's. It is noticeable that in 
five of these six elections, National only achieves a higher loyalty 
rating than Labour on one occasion- 1975. In fact these findings go 
some way towards resolving the paradox arising out of the discrepancy 
between National's edge over Labour in numbers of party identifiers 
and its inability to translate that lead into a stable popular vote 
advantage. 
The swing to Labour in 1978, Labour's retention of its position in 
1981, and Labour's substantial victory at the polls in 1984 are- in a 
sense - all explained by the bar graphs for these three elections which 
are presented in Figure 5. The National Party, of course, fared 
extremely poorly in 1984 when it managed to retain the support of only 
two out of every three of its party identifiers. 
Figures 6 and 7 provide a more detailed breakdown of the voting 
behaviour of Labour and National Party identifiers during the 1972-87 
period. It is noteworthy that in 1972, 1984 and 1987 - three elections 
which saw Labour gain office - roughly one in 10 persons identifying 
themselves with the- National Party nonetheless deserted National to 
vote Labour: a fairly substantial proportion. The only other party to 
capture a healthy share of the vote from amongst National Party 
identifiers was the New Zealand Party in 1984. It is important to 
emphasise here that these defections were not merely among persons 
who had voted for National at a previous election but were, more 
strikingly, among people who told interviewers that they continued to 
identify with National, and to feel themselves to be National Party 
'people' - however weakly and however unhappily - but who had 
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decided to vote for another party, indeed its principal adversary, so as 
to deliver some sort of lesson that year. 
As for the Labour Party's most loyal troops - its 'identifiers' - the 
years in which the highest proportion decided to deliver an unwelcome 
message were 1975, when National came to power, and 1987, when a 
Labour government about which many of the party's traditionally most 
committed followers felt decidedly uncomfortable was nonetheless 
returned. In both those years and in the others summarised in Figure 7, 
however, meagre proportions left Labour to vote National. This reflects 
both the stronger sense of party identification found among Labour 
identifiers, and their more pronounced negative orientation towards 
Labour's main rival, National: feelings much stronger and much more 
widespread than comparable sentiments among National identifiers. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that although the tetti1 'party identification' 
suggests an exclusively positive association with a given party, in fact 
it encompasses aversions as well as loyalties. As we have pointed out 
elsewhere, 'persons identifying with a particular party are at the same 
time taking up a position against that party's principal antagonist. ' 7 
One apparent consequence of the at least traditionally much more 
pronounced ideological content associated with a Labour stance has 
been a rather stronger underlying enmity towards the party's strongest 
opponent, National. A contributing factor to Labour's higher loyalty 
rate among those identifying with the party, by contrast with National 
identifiers, is that - as the data in Figures 6 and 7 show - it has been 
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Figure 7: How Labour Party Identifiers Voted, 1972 to 1987 
0/o 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 
Election year 
Vote: 
Labour 
National 
Soc/Dem 
Values 
~NZP 
Others 
D Non-vote 
61 
somewhat more difficult for Labour identifiers to take the step of voting 
for the only opposing party likely to deprive Labour of office. This 
sense of estrangement from a party's chief rival is a useful measure of 
party identification. When Labour identifiers can view a National 
government with equanimity - and, indeed, do little to prevent its 
occurrence - then it seems obvious that the mix of beliefs and feelings 
associated with their previous partisanship has begun to dissolve. This 
is a point worth bearing in mind subsequently in considering the 
implications of our 1990 survey data. 
Figures 8 and 9 chart the loyalty of Labour and National Party 
identifiers respectively by the strength of their party identification. With 
only one exception over the 1972-87 period, as the strength of Labour 
Party identification _declines, so too does the loyalty of Labour Party 
identifiers. Similarly, with but one exception, the loyalty of National 
Party identifiers also declines with the strength of their identification 
with National.8 These two Figures, which summarise a quite consider-
able body of data, are further evidence of the analytical utility of a 
concept which depends on respondents' abilities to ascribe both their 
own party identification and the strength of that bond. 
It is noteworthy that both Figures show very strong identifiers from 
both the Labour and National camps with very similar loyalty ratings. 
Between 90 per cent and 100 per cent of strong party identifiers, 
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Figure 8: The Loyalty of Labour Party Identifiers by the 
Strength of their Party Identification, 1972 to 1987 
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irrespective of party or election year, vote for the major party with 
which they identify. 
However, the data contained in the two Figures - which follow the 
same pattern - also suggest some important differences. Fairly strong 
Labour Party identifiers are, almost without exception, between 80 per 
cent and 90 per cent likely to vote for the Labour Party. Fairly strong 
National Party identifiers, on the other hand, have a lower loyalty 
rating. They are, for the most part, clustered between 75 and 83 per 
cent. Likewise, while those identifying more weakly with Labour are, 
generally speaking, from 60 per cent to 75 per cent loyal to their party, 
in four out of the six electoral cases summarised in Figure 9 weak 
National identifiers are less than 60 per cent loyal. Once again, 
therefore, National identifiers are weaker than Labour identifiers in 
respect of loyalty and - as a result - Labour is able to win elections in 
New Zealand even though it does not have as many party identifiers as 
National. 
The 1990 Survey 
Against this background of relationships the most recent data, for 1990, 
can now be assessed. Not surprisingly, given the electoral result, 1990 
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Figure 10: Party Identification in New Zealand in 1990 
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On the other hand, recalling Winston Peters' words alluded to at the 
start of this chapter about National seeking to 'sleepwalk to victory', 
84.6 per cent of National identifiers walked into polling booths -
whether awake or semi-comatose we have not sought to detert11ine -
and voted National. This was the best perforn1ance which National has 
achieved among its own identifiers since the Muldoon-led win of 1975. 
National's sizeable 1990 victory reflected a massive drop in support 
for Labour - from 48.0 per cent of the vote in 1987 to 35.1 per cent of 
the vote in 1990- rather than a massive surge towards National, which 
only increased its proportion of the vote from 44.0 per cent to 47.8 per 
cent of the vote. This attenuated enthusiasm for the winning party was 
reflected earlier in data (given in Figure 1 0) which showed that the 
proportion of respondents identifying with National had not increased 
significantly. Similarly, among those who identified with National in 
1990, there was no appreciable redistribution in the statistics describing 
the strength of their identification. A plurality of National identifiers 
(39.8 per cent) identified 'fairly strong[ly]' with the party, and there 
were more weak identifiers (32.4 per cent) than 'very strong' identifiers 
(26.4 per cent). In addition, the pattern resembles more closely the 
1978-87 distribution than the one for 1975, in which the proportion of 
very strong identifiers reached one in three. 
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Figure 11: The Loyalty of Major Party Identifiers, 1972 to 1990 
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Figure 12: The Strength of National Party Identification, 1972 to 
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Figure 13: The Strength of Labour Party Identification, 1972 to 
1990 
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The statistics for strength of identification for Labour identifiers, 
however, represent an abrupt change with the past. As Figure 13 shows, 
only 17.2 per cent of Labour identifiers described their bond to their 
party as 'very strong' -the lowest figure for either party since our mid-
campaign survey work began in 1975 (see note 4 with respect to the 
1972 data), and less than half the 1984 result. This continued, in 
somewhat spectacular fashion, the decline in intensity of commitment 
among Labour identifiers that this series of surveys began to observe 
in 1987. 
In addition, and perhaps even more remarkably, the largest group of 
persons identifying with Labour were those who characterised that 
relationship as 'not very strong'. This was the first time that that 
category has been the largest for either of the two major parties since 
we began asking these questions of New Zealanders seven elections 
ago. Such a finding further underscores the somewhat tenuous 
connection which many persons regarding themselves as Labour felt 
towards the party in October 1990. 
Finally, the 1990 survey data deprived the Labour Party of the 
principal advantage which was available to it in past elections, and 
which had been responsible - when the election results are looked at 
solely in tertilS of party identification- for its general election victories 
and popular vote successes: namely, the higher rate of loyalty among 
its identifiers compared with National's. 
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In 1990, for all categories of identifiers - very strong, fairly strong, 
and not very strong - higher proportions of Labour identifiers deserted 
their party, either to vote for minor parties or to abstain from taking 
part in the election. By contrast, 99.1 per cent of respondents very 
strongly identifying with National voted for the party - as opposed to 
92.3 per cent of similar Labour respondents - while 89.1 per cent of 
fairly strong National identifiers similarly stayed with the party. (The 
comparable figure for Labour was 79.2 per cent, 10 points lower.) 
Finally, roughly two-thirds (67.1 per cent) of those identifying weakly 
with National supported the party on election day. Not much more than 
half - 55.0 per cent - of Labour's not very strong identifiers were 
similarly inclined. 
For National, the pattern which this statistical infot111ation makes is 
strikingly close to that fortited by the 1975 survey responses- so close, 
indeed, that the line for 1990 in Figure 15 covers that for 1975! For 
Labour, however, the electoral loyalty in 1990 among all but its most 
intensely committed- that is, for those with a moderate or weak associ-
ation with the party - was the lowest which we have discovered in any 
of seven successive electoral surveys. Indeed, Labour Party identifiers 
in 1990 were considerably more prepared to vote for the National Party 
than vice-versa. In 1990, 4.8 per cent of Labour identifiers voted 
National, while only 1.8 per cent of those who identified with the 
National Party voted for Labour. Furthertnore - as Figure 16 illustrates 
- Labour identifiers were also far more apt to cast their votes for minor 
parties- that is, for the Greens or for New Labour- than were National 
Party identifiers in 1990. Figure 16 also shows that for a majority of 
disaffected Labour identifiers, the easiest option was not to vote at all. 
The more embittered might claim therefore that Labour was betrayed 
by its own followers; others might respond that the party was aban-
doned by those who themselves felt betrayed. 
Conclusion 
This chapter is not an examination of all of the major factors influenc-
ing voting behaviour in New Zealand. It does, however, look at 
responses to several questions on party identification which have been 
asked of representative samples of New Zealanders over a period of 
seven elections, from 1972 to 1990. Despite a widely observed 
volatility in New Zealand politics, the concept of party identification 
has persisted as a meaningful force in electoral events. At the same 
time, however, New Zealand voters, like those elsewhere, have shown 
themselves prepared to desert the parties with which they identify, and 
to use their identification as a fluid guide rather than a restricting 
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Figure 14: The Loyalty of Labour Party Identifiers by the 
Strength of their Party Identification, 1972 to 1990 
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Figure 15: The Loyalty of National Party Identifiers by the 
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Figure 16: How Labour and National Party Identifiers Voted in 
1990 
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straitjacket when it comes to casting their votes. This has had a 
dramatic effect on the results of elections in New Zealand: the National 
Party has not had a stranglehold on the allegiance of the New Zealand 
electorate (as the overall figures for party identification might have 
implied), as National has had to fight at least as hard as Labour for 
electoral success. 
During the six successive elections from 1972 to 1987, the Labour 
Party managed to get more votes than National on five occasions in 
part because its party identifiers displayed a greater sense of loyalty to 
their party. In 1990, however, this came to a sudden end. National 
identifiers saw an opportunity to remove Labour from office, and large 
proportions of Labour's own - many of them aware of the party's 
desperate plight - chose to let that happen. The loyalties of Labour's 
own adherents - loyalties no doubt based on an idiosyncratic mix of 
hope for the future and gratitude for the past - had been enough in 
previous years to soothe and at times restore to office New Zealand's 
'unnatural' party of government, its perpetual underdog, Labour. But in 
1990 those soothing sentiments were most conspicuous by their 
absence. To return to the metaphor suggested at the outset: for the 
Labour Party it appears as though, for the moment at least, the bath 
may have run a bit cold. 
70 Stephen Levine & Nigel S. Roberts 
For Labour strategists concerned that some of the warmth may have 
gone out of the relationship with their once more passionate followers, 
a possible 'balm [for] hurt minds' - to return to Macbeth's anguished 
ruminations - comes from two sources. The first is in the traditionally 
more politically engaged character of Labour enthusiasts. Eager to 
'idealize' once more, and unwilling to concede deep-rooted convictions 
about the importance of politics and the possibility of change, there 
remains at least a latent readiness for their identification with Labour 
to be reinvigorated, and their voting loyalties stirred once again. This 
could possibly occur if the Labour party presents itself as a credible 
force for values associated with a more distant Labour heritage -
egalitarianism and social justice - as well as with more recent ideals -
national pride and self-reliance, environmentalism, and multi-cultural-
• 
lSffi. 
The second source, not surprisingly, stems from the character of 
Labour's opposition. As National stumbles, Labour gains new opportun-
ities to draw its recently disheartened sympathisers closer to it. Labour 
can expect to gain improved 'loyalty ratings' - higher proportions of 
the vote from those describing themselves as Labour identifiers - in 
1993 if it is seen as a plausible alternative to a disappointing National 
administration. 
The 1990 survey data, explored against the backdrop of Shakes-
peare's language, evoked the image of a Labour body slipping into 
chilly waters. But there was no suggestion of Labour being lowered 
beneath the ground: a cold bath is not a burial. If Labour remains a 
'value-creating' party,l0 there is every reason to expect - and it is 
appropriate to acknowledge this at a 75th anniversary commemoration 
-that it may regain its capacity again to inspire those who have looked 
towards it in recent times for leadership, judgment and resolve. 
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Who Joins the Labour Party 
and What Do They Think? 
Jack Vowles 
Once upon a time the question 'who joins the Labour Party and what 
do they think' would have had an obvious answer. From the late 
nineteenth century into the early decades of the twentieth century 
Labour and social democratic parties promoted the interests of the 
manual working class - specifically wage earners employed in or 
retired from jobs in manufacturing, construction, mining, transport, and 
agriculture, and their families. 1 Thus members of the working class 
tended to be found disproportionately among the members of such 
parties, which also had explicit programmes which included commit-
ments to varying degrees of public ownership of productive property, 
welfare policies, and support for workers and their unions. 
As is well known, since the 1930s Labour and social democratic 
parties have become progressively more broad-based. Of course, 
persons from the middle classes and particularly intellectuals partici-
pated in such parties from their beginnings, although more so in 
European social democratic parties than in the Labour parties of the 
English-speaking democracies.2 The changing social foundations of the 
New Zealand Labour Party have been extensively documented, both in 
te11ns of electoral support3 and active membership.4 Class voting has 
fallen steadily in New Zealand since 1963, the first election for which 
reliable data is available, from an Alford index score of 30 to one of 9 
in 1987 and only 5 at the 1990 election. Meanwhile those belonging to 
the traditional productive working class made up only 11 per cent of 
the delegates at Labour's 1988 annual conference, compared to about 
25 per cent of the electorate in 1987.5 
Until the late 1970s, in tertns of the political attitudes of its members 
and the general tenor of its programmes and policies, the New Zealand 
Labour Party could be easily compared to its counterparts elsewhere, 
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perhaps leaning slightly more to the centre than to the left. But having 
come to power in 1984, Labour's parliamentary caucus made a 
dramatic, rapid and decisive shift to the right. Virtually all traditional 
expectations of a Labour government were confounded. While previous 
Labour governments had emphasised direct control over monetary 
policy, and had operated within a Keynesian framework, the fourth 
Labour government adopted a monetarist approach and had, by 1990, 
given the Reserve Bank considerable autonomy to control monetary 
policy with the reduction of inflation as its overriding goal. The 
financial sector was deregulated, price controls abolished, quantitative 
import controls removed, and a programme of tariff reduction set in 
motion. By 1990 unemployment had increased to levels unheard of 
since the Great Depression. Meanwhile the government had reduced the 
progressivity of the income tax system, and introduced the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST), a value-added tax with virtually no exemptions. 
State trading departments and government corporations and companies 
were privatised, with substantial job losses. While social policy was 
more tightly targetted on those most in need, the real value of most 
benefits declined although there was an overall increase in government 
expenditure. 6 
Some aspects of government policy were not consistent with an 
overall shift to the right. Although under pressure to do so, the 
government did not cut social welfare expenditure, nor did it rapidly 
deregulate the labour market. Labour also established a Ministry of 
Women's Affairs and introduced legislation to promote gender pay 
equity. And in 1985 the government enacted legislation to prevent 
nuclear warships from entering New Zealand harbours. Labour therefore 
could claim some remaining credentials to qualify itself as a party of 
the left, across a mixture of traditional social democratic and more 
contemporary non-economic so-called 'new politics' issues. 
Two processes of change have therefore been at work, the first a 
long-term transformation of the social foundations of the Labour Party, 
and the second a more recent short-term rightward shift of a particular 
Labour government. Explanations for these changes are varied. There 
are descriptions of the Labour Party's capture by the middle class as the 
result of social evolution 7 and union and party leadership strategies. 8 
In a number of the accounts which focus on long-ter111 change, there are 
two strands sometimes woven together, one acknowledging Labour's 
need to change with the times, another implying that Labour's leaders 
have somehow failed in their moral or historical purposes. Explanations 
for the short-tertn policy shift since 1984 are even more controversial. 
The process was accompanied by the coming to power of a new 
generation.9 Certain changes in the political thought of the Labour 
Party during the 1970s have been noted. 10 There are Marxist accounts 
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which focus on the necessary restructuring of New Zealand capitalism 
in response to economic crisis, thus detenr1ining state policies regardless 
of the party in power. These are convincing in broad outline but less so 
in detail, and imply an absence of alternative options also asserted from 
the right. 11 It is also easy to imply a connection between the Iong-tern1 
transforn1ation of the party from a working class to a mid~dle class party 
since the 1930s and the retreat of the Labour government from social 
democracy during the 1980s. 
Yet the long tertn changes in the foundations of New Zealand Labour 
have been far from unique. In broad outline, changes in the New 
Zealand Labour Party up to 1984 have been very much in line with 
experiences elsewhere. In order to gain power, Labour and social 
democratic parties everywhere have had to seek middle class allies in 
order to secure parliamentary majorities. 12 
Meanwhile the relative size of the traditional productive manual 
working class has grown smaller, obliging Labour parties to intensify 
their efforts to move beyond their traditional 'cloth cap' image and 
support base. In tertns of party philosophy and objectives, commitments 
to public ownership of industry have become less and less a part of 
social democratic Labour objectives, links with and support for unions 
have weakened, although support for the welfare state has in most cases 
remained an article of faith for both Labour and social democratic 
parties. Most West European social democratic parties have retreated 
from many aspects of their traditional objectives but few if any shifted 
so far and so fast as did the New Zealand Labour government of 1984 
to 1990. Changes in the social foundations of the party may have been 
a necessary condition for radical policy shift; but such changes on their 
own cannot provide a sufficient explanation. 
Value change among elites and the mass public provides another 
possible focus through which explanations of change in the Labour 
Party may be found. New so-called 'postmaterialist' issues have also 
emerged to spawn movements of middle class radicalism which have 
in many countries been taken up by social democratic parties. Within 
the New Zealand Labour Party those attributing a higher priority to 
'new politics' and those still more committed to traditional social 
democratic objectives fought through their differences during the 1970s. 
An upsurge of party membership during the decade probably contrib-
uted to Labour's increasing commitment to give higher priorities to 
political concerns such as race relations, gender inequality, opposition 
to nuclear weapons, and protection of the environment. 
Theories about the 'new politics' have been extensively applied in 
the United States and Europe. According to Ronald Inglehart, a slow 
change of values has been occurring among significant sections of both 
the mass electorate and political elites. 13 Inglehart's theory is based on 
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a view of human motivation which assumes that all persons by virtue 
of their very biological existence have a hierarchy or ordering of needs. 
First, people need sustenance: food, shelter, and economic security. 
Second, they need safety from violence and threats to themselves, their 
resources, and property. These priorities are labelled materialist: that is, 
both safety and sustenance are concerned with preserving people's 
material well-being. Sustenance needs are also primarily economic. 
Inglehart measures the importance of these by weighing the priority 
over other policy options that people give to combatting inflation. 
Similarly, the need for safety is measured by the priority that people 
give to maintaining social order. 
lnglehart argues that the generations coming to political maturity 
before World War II were predominantly 'materialists'. Those growing 
up from the 1950s onwards have, by contrast, a significant and growing 
minority of people who are 'postmaterialists'. Postmaterialists value 
people having more say in government and having free speech. The 
balance of materialists and postmaterialists, lnglehart argues, is 
accounted for by the changing historical circumstances that people 
experience, especially when they are growing up and their values and 
outlooks are forn1ing. People growing up in western democracies since 
1950 have matured into a world vastly different from that of the 
previous generation which had experienced both economic depression 
and war, that is major threats to their material well-being and even 
survival. During the 1950s living standards in most western democ-
racies improved dramatically. Never before had so many people lived 
in such prosperity and comfort. A substantial minority of these post-
World War II generations have tended to take for granted their 
economic security and well-being and therefore put a higher priority on 
other postmaterialist values. 
Inglehart goes on to argue that the development of postmaterialism 
as a set of value preferences among voters has had effects on the 
ideological and value foundations of party competition. Until the 1960s, 
party competition in most Western democracies took place between 
parties which represented left and right wing political philosophies. 
Right wing or conservative parties preferred a free market, and left 
wing or progressive parties preferred state intervention and redistribu-
tion of wealth. According to Ingleheart postmaterialism has provided a 
new foundation for value conflict between political parties, and has 
come to modify and in some cases displace the traditional left-right 
cleavage between major political parties. Thus postmaterialism is said 
to be responsible for declining class voting, and in particular has led 
parties of the left to take up new issues and modify and sometimes 
abandon their traditional policies of state intervention. Thus Inglehart 
allows us to reinterpret long-tettn changes in the social composition and 
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electoral support of the Labour Party within a new framework. And 
with respect to the question of short-term policy shift, it has been 
suggested elsewhere that the influence of postmaterialism on the New 
Zealand Labour Party may have been particularly important, providing 
at least a partial explanation for its radicalism on non-economic issues 
such as nuclear weapons, and its movement to the right with respect to 
management of the econ~omy. 14 
Party Activists and Conferences 
Data on the social composition of Labour's party organisation and the 
political attitudes of Labour Party active members and MPs is available 
to throw some light on the questions posed above. Analysis of the 
social composition of active Labour party membership immediately 
prior to the Fourth Labour ~overnment is available from a survey of the 
1983 annual conference. 1 A further survey of the Labour Party 
conference was mounted in 1988 in order to further investigate the 
composition of the party's active membership. 16 Data across various 
dimensions of political attitudes was collected. 17 
To the extent that support for the government could be found among 
Labour party activists, there were hints that since 1985 at least a new 
middle class membership was entering the party. Labour certainly 
enjoyed the verbal and financial support of a number of businessmen 
and financiers including Sir Robert Jones, founder of the New Zealand 
Party, which had contested the 1984 election with an economic 
programme having more in common with the subsequent policies of the 
Labour government than the Labour party's own manifesto. There was 
also evidence that MPs were making efforts to persuade party members 
more sympathetic to the views of the government to attend conferences. 
But somewhat to the surprise of the researchers, there were only 
marginal changes in the social composition of both the National and 
Labour parties between 1983 and 1988!8 Table 1 compares some 
occupational categories between the two conferences. The figures must 
be interpreted with some caution. Increases in the proportions of union 
officials and MPs are largely due to the smaller size of the 1988 
conference (537 attending) as compared to that in 1983 (753 delegates). 
For example, on a base of all delegates, not just those in the labour 
force as shown in Table 1, 15 per cent of the 537 delegates in 1988 
implies that there were 84 union officials attending; 11 per cent of the 
753 attending in 1988 indicates the same number, 84. As almost all 
unions affiliated to the party in 1983 were still affiliated in 1988, we 
would expect this consistency. As ordinary party membership declined 
over the same period, we would expect the number of delegates 
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Table 1: Occupations of Labour Party Delegates in the Full-time 
Labour Force, 1983 and 1988 Conferences, and occupations of 
the adult population (percentages) 
1983 
Manager/Sales 12 
Professional 26 
Teachers 16 
Clerical 8 
Farmers I 
Manual/ Service 19 
Union Officials 14 
MPs 4 
N 265 
1988 
9 
18 
16 
11 
1 
14 
20 
11 
245 
1986 
Census 
15 
12 
3 
18 
5 
47 
-
Table 2: Employment Status and Sector of Economy of Labour 
Party Delegates in the Full-time Labour Force, 1983 and 1988, 
compared to the adult population (percentages) 
Self employed 
Public Sector 
Other employees 
N 
1983 
16 
55 
29 
225 
1988 
9 
53 
38 
227 
1986 
Census 
16 
22 
62 
representing branches in particular to fall. It might be that more MPs 
attended the conference in 1988 than in 1983 - with Labour in 
government there were of course, more MPs to attend. Given all this, 
teachers and clerical workers seem to have held their representation at 
the expense of other professionals and managers. While the 'middle 
class' remained dominant, the higher categories of the middle class 
occupations had shrunk somewhat. But these are the very groups whose 
presence should have increased if supporters of Labour's economic 
policies had flocked to join the party, and if MPs had sought to 
encourage the attendance of a new phenomenon - the Labour 'yuppie'. 
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Nevertheless, the composition of the conference had changed signifi-
cantly by individuals if not by occupational categories, for 40 per cent 
of the delegates to Labour's 1988 conference had attended their first 
conference in 1985 or later, and for 17 per cent it was their first 
conference. 
On other relevant aspects of social structure there were small signs 
of change, but the general pattern was one of continuity. While there 
was a slight tendency for Labour delegates to have somewhat lower 
incomes than delegates to the National Party conference in 1983, there 
were virtually no differences in the distribution of household incomes 
across the National and Labour Party conferences in 1988. Delegates at 
both conferences, as in 1983, had substantially higher incomes than the 
population in general. Otherwise, the Labour conference in 1988 was 
very much like that of 1983, over-representing persons in the labour 
force, people with higher education, public sector workers (see Table 
2), and trade union members. But because the National Party 
conference heavily over-represented the self-employed, and under-
represented the major urban areas, of the two the profile of the Labour 
conference was the more representative of the overall population. 68 per 
cent of Labour delegates lived in a household containing a union 
member, as compared to 19 per cent of National delegates. 57 per cent 
of Labour delegates were union members or union officials, as 
compared to 9 per cent of National delegates and 28 per cent of the 
adult population. 75 per cent lived in a household where either the 
delegate him or herself or their partner belonged to a union or other 
organisation representing their interests at work. 19 Most of Labour's 
unionists were in nonmanual occupations but, nevertheless, as in 1983, 
in ter1ns of its active membership the Labour Party in 1988 was still to 
a considerable extent a union party, and thus closer in structure to its 
historical traditions than many have claimed.20 But it was also a party 
of intellectuals, 40 per cent of delegates having a university degree. 
Both in teiins of its government's policies, and in many if not all 
respects of its social composition, the New Zealand Labour Party of 
1988 was a very different creature as compared to, say, the Labour 
Party in 1938. But there was nothing in the essence of those differences 
which leads inevitably to the conclusion that Labour party activists in 
1988 were more conservative or less committed to social democracy 
than those of 1938. Further1nore between 1983 and 1988 the party 
proved itself remarkably resistant to short-ter1n change in social 
composition. 
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Ideological Change and Internal Party 
Debate 
Possible claims that Labour party activists in the 1980s were greatly 
more conservative than their counterparts of earlier decades are also 
called into question by the considerable conflict within the party 
between 1983 and 1988. A significant number of party activists 
opposed the direction of the governments' policies. The organisational 
leadership was itself critical of the government. However, this criticism 
was muted, as part of a strategy to constructively engage the political 
leadership of the party in debate, in an attempt to ameliorate and 
modify the worst aspects of its policies. Others within the party were 
much less restrained in their opposition. Meanwhile there also appeared 
a faction in enthusiastic support of the government's economic policies, 
the so-called 'Backbone Club'. The extent to which the active member-
ship of the party opposed or supported the policies of the government 
was unclear, at least to outside observers. Was the party becoming 
divided into factions on the basis of ideology, or did there remain a 
substantial consensus? Despite continuity in the composition of the 
party during the 1980s, by 1988 the political attitudes of active Labour 
party members could no longer be assumed to be as predictable as they 
might have been even 10 years earlier. An explicit right wing faction 
had been fortned and two other albeit much less well-defined groupings 
were identified by a number of observers: a 'left' and a 'centre-left'. 
Moreover, there was a closely contested election for the vacant 
Presidency of the party between fortner President Jim Anderton, 
supported by the left, and Ruth Dyson, supported by the centre-left and 
right. Dyson won, but much more narrowly than had been expected.21 
The 1988 Conference questionnaire did not inquire how delegates 
voted in the Presidential contest, nor did it ask if delegates saw 
themselves as a part of a particular faction or tendency in the party. It 
included a number of attitudinal questions which can be deployed in 
order to discern what Labour Party activists thought, and the extent to 
which groups of Labour party activists thought differently. Useful 
starting points are conference delegates' self-placement on the left-right 
scale, and their responses to a question which sought their opinions 
about a socialist versus a private enterprise economy. 
Table 3 shows the percentages of delegates who situated themselves 
from left to right, within the various categories running between 
extreme socialism and extreme privatisation. The column to the right 
with figures in brackets shows the percentages for all respondents on 
the left-right scale. Not surprisingly, the most favoured category is 
'centre left', points 3 and 4 on a 10-point scale from 1 (left) to 10 
(right), other respondents spreading fairly evenly between 'left', 
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Table 3: Delegates' Position on the Left-Right Scale Against 
Opinions on a Socialist versus a Free Enterprise Economy 
Left (1, 2) 
Centre Left (3, 4) 
Centre (5) 
Right (6-10) 
Percentages by Column 
AS MS 
60 46 
40 47 
0 5 
0 2 
ss 
10 
64 
20 
6 
M AP (f) 
10 
51 
22 
17 
8 (17) 
29 (51) 
13 (17) 
50 (15) 
(Total o/o by row) (3) (17) (14) (59) (7) 
N 10 59 50 204 24 347 
AS=All Socialist; MS=Mostly Socialist; SS=Somewhat Socialist; M=Mixed; 
AP=All Private; T=Total. 
Spearman's Rank Conelation: 0.48 
'centre', and 'right', although the latter category again not unexpectedly 
is the least favoured at 15 per cent. Meanwhile the second lowest row 
of the table with figures in brackets indicates in which socialist to 
private economy categories all respondents placed themselves. Again, 
the vast majority favoured a mixed economy, with smaller groups 
opting for more socialism and a very small group favouring a complete-
ly private economy. Nevertheless the extreme 'all private' group is 
twice the size of the 'all socialist' category. The distribution of 
respondents among the cells of the table indicates that there is the 
correlation between the two sets of opinions that we would expect, 
socialists being more likely to be left and admirers of a private 
economy to the right. The Spearman's rank correlation between the two 
variables is 0.48, indicating a modest relationship. It is weaker than 
some might expect because of the tendency of respondents across both 
opinion dimensions _to opt for the centre or mixed categories. Here is 
some possible evidence for more moderate views on these questions 
among party activists than in earlier decades, although given the lack 
of earlier data before 1970 such inferences can only be speculative. In 
fact Labour had abandoned much of its objectives of state ownership 
by the 1930s, with only token opposition from small sections of the 
party conference. 
Such general questions provide a good starting point, but only 
scratch the surface. Left and right are useful estimates of where people 
feel they locate themselves politically, but their specific cognitive 

I 
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Table 4: Factor Analyses of Attitude Variables Among Labour 
Party Conference Delegates 1988 
(Principal Components, Varimax Rotation, Mean Substitution of 
Missing Values) 
Economic Issues 
Social 
Spend Mofe Social Policy .79 
Spend More Health .78 
Spend More Unemployed .77 
Reduce Unemployment .76 
Solve Unemployment First .65 
Free Trade Unions .13 
Take Private Profits .18 
Unions Not Enough Power .40 
Big Business Power Own Good .07 
Big Business Too Much Power 
Eigenvalue 
Variance Explained 
.14 
3.06 
30.6 
Non-econontic Issues 
Anti-
Union Business 
.14 
.10 
.20 
.11 
.29 
.84 
.76 
.55 
.06 
.17 
1.77 
17.7 
.06 
.14 
.11 
.12 
.09 
.15 
.15 
.31 
.85 
.78 
1.50 
15.0 
Maori Women Ecology Freedom 
Maori Fishing Rights 
Maori Land Rights 
Improve Maori Conditions 
Maori Special Benefits 
Jobs Worse For Women 
Not Enough Women's Equality 
Legal Homosexuality 
Spend More Environment 
More Protection Environment 
More Media Nudity and Sex 
No Censorship 
Eigenvalue 
Variance Explained 
.89 
.89 
.80 
.70 
.21 
.29 
.15 
.12 
.12 
-.01 
-.05 
2.90 
26.3 
.11 
.16 
.20 
.38 
.78 
.69 
.64 
.08 
.10 
.05 
-.15 
1.75 
15.9 
.10 
.16 
.11 
.00 
.02 
.11 
.12 
.88 
.87 
-.02 
.04 
1.60 
14.6 
.01 
-.04 
-.06 
.01 
-.21 
-.23 
.29 
.02 
.01 
.86 
.75 
1.49 
13.5 
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Table 5: The Political Attitudes of Four Attitudinal Clusters 
Within the Labour Party Conference, 1988 
Means of Attitude Variables, 0 to 1 (x 100) 
Centre 
Left Left Rightl Right2 All 
Socialism-Private 51 29 22 18 38 
Social 81 68 51 38 71 
Union 91 77 33 27 77 
Anti-business 95 92 64 79 90 
Maori 78 48 46 41 61 
Women 91 77 76 63 82 
Ecology 85 70 60 81 76 
Freedom 35 19 27 90 30 
N 158 139 37 14 
Party conference, at least three coherent groupings were required. At 
least two had to be of roughly equivalent size. These requirements 
reflect the frequently acknowledged existence of three groups, and the 
close contest for the Party Presidency in 1988. To attain two such 
groups, four clusters were eventually chosen. 
Although the party's presidential contest for111s the backdrop to this 
analysis, there is no attempt to claim that the ideological clusters of 
delegates here identified might closely correspond in voting patterns at 
the conference, although we would have expected them to correspon,d 
to some degree to delegates' self-identification if those had been 
solicited. But there are numerous reasons why ideology alone might not 
predict the Presidential vote, such as cross-cutting personal loyalties, 
directions from bodies represented, a desire not to embarrass the party 
leadership, and strategic questions to do with means rather than ends. 
Yet Table 5 does indicate four groupings which reflect many of the 
ideological differen~es which lay behind the events at the conference. 
The two largest groupings clearly represent the left and the centre-
left, the left being the largest group. The figures in the table are means 
where 100 would indicate the most progressive or left wing position 
possible, 0 the most right wing or conservative. Thus the figures 
represent the position of the average respondents in each group. For all 
attitudinal dimensions but one the average delegate in the left cluster 
has the highest score, and in all but two the average respondent in the 
centre-left cluster has the score closest to the conference mean score. 
The two right wing clusters are more difficult to interpret, but are 
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Table 6: Social, Organisational, and Ideological Characteristics of 
Four Attitudinal Clusters Within the Labour Party 
Conference, 1988 
Cluster Total 
Membership 
1985 or Since 
1984 or Before 
First Conference 
1985 or Since 
1984 or Before 
Office Holder 
Office Holder 
Not Office Holder 
Represents 
Affiliate 
Party 
Work and Union 
Unionised Production 
Unionised Middle 
Nonunion Middle 
Union Official 
MP 
Left/Right 
Left (1-3) 
Centre ( 4-6) 
Right (7-10) 
Postmaterialist 
Postmaterialist 
Intet tnediate 
Materialist 
Frequencies by Row 
Left Centre Right Right All N 
45 
53 
44 
51 
41 
48 
41 
55 
42 
25 
60 
33 
67 
19 
71 
33 
8 
66 
39 
14 
Left 1 2 
41 
40 
41 
36 
44 
38 
44 
44 
40 
64 
33 
40 
31 
62 
26 
50 
33 
27 
45 
55 
10 
3 
11 
8 
12 
12 
9 
0 
14 
11 
7 
16 
0 
15 
3 
11 
42 
5 
27 
27 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
3 
6 
1 
5 
0 
0 
11 
2 
4 
0 
6 
17 
2 
5 
5 
(100) 349 
(11) 38 
(89) 269 
(40) 142 
(60) 214 
(53) 189 
(47) 169 
(23) 80 
(77) 269 
(8) 28 
(34) 118 
(33) 114 
(15) 51 
(7) 26 
(41) 138 
(52) 175 
(7) 24 
(27) 62 
(64) 150 
(9) 22 
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distinguished from each other on social, environmental, women's, and 
libertarian dimensions. The very small 'right2' group is most oonserva-
tive economically, more progressive environmentally, more conservative 
on women, and very strongly libertarian on censorship issues. 'Rightl' 
is a more moderate and conventional centre-right, the most conservative 
on environmental issues and also the cluster most favourable to 
business. 
The left cluster stands out from the others particularly in its tendency 
to give greater support for a more socialist economy, and to support 
more action on issues relevant to Maori and women. The contrast 
between the left and the other clusters on Maori issues is particularly 
sharp. Because the measurement of socialist versus a private economy 
is a rank order, the mean reported may be a little misleading and 
frequencies more reliable. Of those in the left cluster, 60 per cent 
favoured 'some socialist' (21 per cent), 'most socialist' (32 per cent), 
or 'all socialist' (6 per cent), but in the centre-left cluster, only 16 per 
cent favoured any of those options, 76 per cent favouring a mixed 
economy as compared to 40 per cent among the left. The left was also 
prone to be a little more petnlissive on censorship issues than the 
centre-left or moderate centre-right, and was also by far the strongest 
in its commitment to social expenditure. 
Social, Organisational, and Other 
Ideological Characteristics 
This ideological and attitudinal map of the Labour Party Conference of 
1988 tends to fill out most exrctations, except for the very small size 
of the right, and its division.2 The final step is to explore some other 
characteristics of the various clusters and test some relevant hypotheses. 
Table 6 begins with some organisational variables. Percentages read 
across the table, and the propensity of certain clusters to contain more 
in a certain category than average can be easily identified by comparing 
each row with the total cluster frequencies listed in the top row. For 
example, on the assl.!mption that Labour might have attracted members 
sympathetic to its economic policies since about 1985, we might expect 
those assigned to the two right wing groups to be more recent members 
(or members more recently active) than those assigned to the left and 
centre-left. The evidence tends to refute this conjecture: those in the left 
cluster are more likely to have joined from 1985 onward (53 per cent 
of new members since 1985 being in the left cluster, as opposed to the 
percentage of all delegates in the cluster of 45 per cent). Similarly those 
in the left cluster were more likely to have attended their first confer-
ence since 1985. But perhaps the most important point to draw from the 
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data is the small number of new 1935 and 
attended the conference - only 11 per ceat. We · also 
centre-left delegates to be more likely to be at 
levels in the party, given the policy of constructive 
generally followed by the organisational leadership. In fact, 
in the left and 'rightl' clusters appear slightly more likely to be 
officeholders. We would expect delegates representing affiliated · 
to be more to the left than average, and thi is the case, whereas 
delegates in the two right clusters are more likely to represent various 
levels of the party itself. None of these organisational effects are very 
strong. And none are statistically significant except the tendency for 
those in the ri~ht wing clusters to represent party organisations rather 
than affiliates. 
The 'work and union' data measures both delegates' union member-
ship or otherwise, job of the principal income earner in the delegates' 
household whether in productive working class versus other occupa-
tions. It also separates out union officials and MPs. As expected, 
Members of Parliament are found more frequently among right and 
centre-left groupings, and much less frequently in the left cluster. Union 
officials are found much more among the left. We could hypothesise 
that delegates from unionised working class families would be more 
likely to be found in the left cluster, but they are in fact more concen-
trated in the centre-left. We could also expect middle class delegates to 
be more likely in the centre-left cluster, those from union families being 
more to the left and those from non-union families more to the right. 
This is indeed the case, middle class union membership having quite 
substantial effects, and having almost as strong an association with left 
cluster assignment as does being a union official. 
The left/right section of the table redistributes the points within the 
left/right scale as compared to the presentation in Table 3 because 
assignment of cluster membership makes it more meaningful in this 
fortil. Delegates' self-placement on the left-right scale has a fairly close 
relation with their cluster location, which works best for the left. But 
only 50 per cent of those who define themselves as 'centre' fit into the 
centre-left cluster. One third have attitudes more in common with the 
left, and 17 per cent with the right. Nearly 60 per cent of those who ee 
themselves as on the right are assigned to either of the two right wing 
clusters, but a third tend to have attitudes more in common with the 
centre-left. 
This may seem to call into question the categories of delegates 
produced by the cluster analysis. But as noted above, delegates' 
placement on the left/right scale is ambiguous, and therefore a 
reliable measure of attitudinal po ition than the ul · dimen · o a1 
analysis just reported. These frequencies are more likely to reflec a 
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Table 7: Social Basis of Left, Centre, and Right Clusters at the 
Labour Party Conference, 1988 
Logistic Regression (Mean substitution of missing values) 
1: First difference between 0 and 1 (b equi valent27 ) 
2: Standardized parameter estimate (beta equivalent) 
1: Socialisation 
Father Farmer 
Father Worker 
University education 
Low education 
Age 
Gender 
ll: Structure 
Household income 
Self-employed household 
Core working class 
household 
Public sector household 
Union official 
MP 
ill: Agency 
Union household 
Business organisation 
member 
Subjective working class 
IV: Location 
Urban 
Rural 
Left against 
Centre-Left 
(Left= I, 
Centre-Left=O) 
1 2 
.13 
-.08 
.16 
-.16 
-.54 
-.10 
00 
.33 
-.11 
.06 
.14 
-.39 
.17 
.27 
-.03 
.01 
-.08 
.09 
-.09 
.17* 
-.15 
-.22* 
-.12 
()() 
.22* 
-.08 
.06 
.12 
-.25* 
.17* 
.10 
-.04 
.02 
-.05 
Right against 
the Rest 
(Right= I' 
Rest=O) 
1 2 
.09 
.04 
-.04 
-.07 
-.09 
-.10 
.04 
.20 
.10 
.03 
-.09 
-.01 
-.08 
.10 
-.06 
.01 
-.07 
.13 
.12 
-.14 
-.25 
-.11 
-.36* 
.02 
.25* 
.17 
.10 
-.33 
-.02 
-.22* 
.09 
-.21 
.04 
-.21 
tendency of delegates who see their views as 'moderate' to wish to 
position themselves in the centre, although their actual political views 
may veer to the right or left. Further, there is another ideological 
dimension which may have some bearing, that of materialism versus 
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postmaterialism. According to this model, a process of value change has 
created a new basis of political competition distinct from left versus 
right. Postmaterialists, materialists, and a 'mixed' category are classified 
according to their choices of two options among four, of which two are 
postmaterialist, and two are materialist. The two materialist preferences 
are 'ma~ntaining order in the nation' and 'fighting rising prices', and 
those who choose both are classified as materialist. The two post-
materialist preferences are 'giving the people more say in government 
decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech' and those who choose 
both are classified as postmaterialist. Those choosing one from either 
category fit into the intermediate or mixed group. 
The distinction between the two right wing clusters on libertarian 
versus nonlibertarian beliefs suggest that there may be a materialist-
postmaterialist cleavage on the right of the Labour Party; in fact, Table 
6 shows no such thing, indicating that the issues measured in that 
dimension are too narrow in scope to be strongly associated with 
postmaterialism. A reading of Inglehart also implies that the dimension 
should also distinguish between the centre-left and the left, the left 
taking an 'old left ' position favouring unions and greater state 
intervention and opposing business, and the centre-left a more 'new 
left' position favouring greater individual freedom, and more attention 
to 'new politics' issues such as the environment, racial justice, and 
women's equality. Yet as Table 5 indicates, the left is the more radical 
on both materialist and postmaterialist issues than the centre-left. Table 
6 confirtns this, indicating that the left are by far the most 'post-
materialist', and that delegates in all other clusters are more materialist 
in their orientations. By contrast, 14 per cent of voters at the 1990 
election were postmaterialists, rising to 40 per cent of those who fell 
into the left cluster. Among MPs, 44 per cent were postmaterialists 
(although those who responded were only 26 out of the 57 in the 
caucus at the time). This is at least provisional evidence for significant 
postmaterialist influence in the Labour Party, influence that is particu-
larly strong to the left and possibly in the Parliamentary caucus. But 
given debate about and criticism of Inglehart's measurement of 
materialism and postmaterialism, these findings should be regarded as 
particular! y provisional. 28 
Putting the Pieces Together 
For more refined analysis multivariate methods are necessary. Logistic 
regressions were run, first with membership of either right wing cluster 
as the dependent variable, and secondly deleting right wing cluster 
delegates, and using membership of the left wing cluster as the 
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dependent variable against membership of the centre-left.29 A wider 
range of social structure variables were employed to further extend the 
analysis.30 
Table 7 indicates that the social foundations of the attitudinal differ-
ences which define the clusters are weak to modest. The left model can 
predict the appropriate cluster location for 76 per cent of the delegates 
in the left and centre-left clusters; the right model can similarly predict 
80 per cent among all delegates. Column 2 for each model provides 
standardized coefficients which can be compared within each model as 
indicators of relative explanatory power, a star to the right of which 
indicates whether or not the figures in either columns 1 or 2 are 
statistically significant. Column 1 provides first difference estimates 
which report the likelihood that a delegate in the category indicated was 
more or less likely to be a member of the cluster after controlling for 
the effects of all the other variables in the model. 
The first model tells us the extent to which delegates were more or 
less likely to be members of the left as opposed to the centre-left 
cluster. Five of the predictor variables produced significant results: a 
person with a university education was 16 per cent more likely to be in 
the left cluster than a delegate in the reference category (a school 
qualification but no degree). The youngest person at the conference was 
54 per cent more likely to be in the left cluster than the ,oldest, and on 
average left-cluster delegates wefe 5 per cent younger than centre-left 
delegates;31 MPs were 39 per cent less likely to be in the left cluster 
than other middle class delegates (the most powerful effect of them all 
according to column 2); delegates from a union household were 17 per 
cent more likely to be in the left cluster; and, somewhat surprisingly, 
delegates from a household where the principle income earner was self-
employed were 33 per cent more likely to be in the left cluster, all 
these being after controlling for the effects of the other variables in the 
model. 
The 'right' model defines the two right categories as one, and 
compares the likelihood of being assigned to either right category 
against that of being assigned to be left or centre-left. While the model 
is a little more po~erful than the 'left' model, only three variables are 
statistically significant. Of these gender is the strongest, a woman 
delegate being 10 per cent less likely to be in either right group than in 
the left or centre-left. Delegates from a self-employed household were 
20 per cent more likely to be in the 'right'; and delegates from union 
households 8 per cent less likely, again after controlling for the effects 
of the other variables. 
Finally, the effects of the two ideological dimensions of left/right 
and materialist/postmaterialist were measured using logistic regression 
models again directed toward left against centre-left (deleting right), and 
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'IBble 8: for 
1: Postmaterialism and Materiali m: fint differeaees 
equivalent); left/right scale first differences betwee cluater 
scale Oeft .255, centre-left .372, right .509, left ud ~ 
2: Standardized parameter estimates (beta ). 
Left against Centre-Left 
(Left 1, Centre-Left 0) 
Right against the rest 
(Right= 1, Rest=O) 
*not significant < .05 
Left r2=.16 c=.83 0=.65 
Right r2=.28 c=.90 0=.80 
Left/Right 
Materialist 
Postrnaterialist 
Left/Right 
Materialist 
Postmaterialist 
1 
-.15 
-.27* 
.25 
.16 
.18 
-.01* 
2 
-.43 
-.14* 
.20 
.71 
.21 
-.05* 
right versus the rest of the delegates. Table 8 reports findings f1om a 
procedure which assesses the effects of left/right, materialism, and 
postmaterialism together, where the effects of the last two variables are 
measured against the mixed category between materialism and 
postmaterialism. First differences and the predicted probability and 
response figures are reported with the social structure variables from 
Table 7 entered as controls. 
Table 8 indicates that the average respondent in the left cluster in 
teritts of placement on the left/right scale was 15 per cent further to the 
left than the average respondent in the centre-left cluster, and the 
average respondent in the right cluster on the left/right scale was 16 per 
cent further to the right than the average respondent in the remainder 
of the sample. Thus a posbnaterialist was 25 per cent more likely to be 
in the left cluster than a delegate in the 'mixed' category, and a 
materialist similarly 18 per cent more likely to be in the right clu ter, 
controlling for all other variables in the model. The trongest effects are 
those of the left/right dimension, although for the left again t centre-left 
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model the effects for materialism and postmaterialism are almost as 
strong. 
Conclusions 
The evidence presented above does not support claims that long-teriil 
changes in party composition might be a necessary or sufficient 
explanation for the Labour government's historic policy shift. Nor had 
that policy shift had any effects in changing the composition of the 
party since 1983. In 1988 Labour as a party retained a significant union 
component both in ter111S of affiliate representation and the union 
memberships of conference delegates. Middle class unionists actually 
tended to be found more among a left cluster of delegates than the 
admittedly small number of working class unionists. Neither were the 
political attitudes of most party members consistent with the general 
thrust of the economic policies of the Labour government. While 
middle class non-unionists did tend more toward the right, only a 
quarter were actually assigned to either right cluster identified, and their 
proportion of the active membership had not increased since 1983. Only 
a small general grouping could be identified having more positive 
attitudes toward business, private ownership, and more negative 
attitudes to unions, who tended to be male, not union members, and to 
be self-employed. This grouping was not disproportionately drawn from 
new members or members who had only recently begun to attend 
conference although, as one would expect, it was significantly less 
likely to contain delegates representing union affiliates. The heaviest 
weight of party opinion remained on the social democratic left, and 
showed no indication of changing in the immediate future, as those 
delegates assigned to the left cluster were younger on average than 
other conference delegates. The exodus of a minority of activists into 
the NewLabour party the following year is unlikely to have had major 
effects on the balance of opinion among active members.33 
Some evidence for the high salience of postmaterialist values among 
party activists is ~lso presented. Such values were particularly strong 
among the left of the party, and provide further support for those who 
argue the importance of an implicit trade-off accepted by party 
members supporting anti-nuclear an~d other policies relevant to the 'new 
politics', and therefore retaining commitment to the party despite its 
economic policies. On the other hand materialists were more concen-
trated on the right. While a more methodologically rigorous application 
of the postmaterialist model is necessary, the political opinions of 1988 
Labour Party conference delegates tend to indicate that postmaterialist 
politics have largely fused with social democratic goals at least insofar 
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Residuals 
Parental Occupation: those respondents whose fathers were neither farmers 
nor manual productive workers. 
Education: those with a school qualification but not a university degree. 
Class: the middle class, that is, respondents in households classified by a 
wage or salary earner not in a manual productive occupation, such as service 
workers, clerical workers, professionals, and salaried managers. 
Urban and rural: those respondents living in towns or cities above 1,000 and 
below 100,000 population. 
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'rl. See Gary King, Unifying PoUtical Methodology: The Uulihood Theory of 
SttJtisticallnference (Cambridge, 1989), p. 107. 
28. Given the nature of the two sets of choices, and the context of New 
Zealand politics in 1988, it is not entirely smprising that postn•aterialism 
should be associated with the left, and materialism with the right, where 
'fighting rising prices' is so obviously compatible with Labour's economic 
policies, and 'giving people more say in important government decisions' could 
be so easily consistent with opposition to them. lnglehart has a more extensive 
battery which should be employed in future research, but even this as been 
subject to some criticism. See R. lnglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced 
Industrial Society (Princeton, 1990), pp. 40-53; J. G. Andersen, 'Environ-
mentalism, New Politics, Industrialism: Some Theoretical Perspectives', 
Scandinavian Political Studies, 13(1990), pp. 102-117. 
29. Logistic regression is the appropriate method where the dependent variable 
is binary. For further advice on its interpretation, see F. Harrell, 'The Logistic 
~ ...... ..,', SAS Supplementary Manual (Cary, 1983), pp. 269-293. 
30. For further detail, see Appendix B. For their use in a model applied to both 
Labour and National Party Conferences in 1988, see Vowles, 'Party Strategies 
and Class Composition', forthcoming. 
31. Estimates from the age extremes somewhat overemphasise the effects of 
age. Taking the mean ages of the centre-left and left clusters as the fmt 
difference figures provides a more meaningful estimate. 
32. See King, Unifying Political Methodology, pp. 107-8. 
33. The late timing of the 1988 conference survey meant that many delegates 
leaving Labour for New Labour did not return their questionnaires. Comparison 
of the 1990 NewLabour conference with the 1988 Labour conference indicates 
only modest differences in opinion between the two sets of delegates, Labour 
MPs being considerably further to the right of Labour conference delegates. 
See Miller, 'NewLabour: A Chip Off the Old Block?' 
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PrbM Ministers 
a of objecti •ty which is difficult for 
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is based on my observations, I have not 
as one of the 'mode1n' Labour Prime Ministus. 
, or even met, Non•1an Kirk, and was out of New 
Zealand his period as Prbne Minister. I have, however, applied 
Barber' framework to Kirk in an earlier review article. 2 I also consider 
that a caae caa in any case be made to categorise Kirk as a 'traditional' 
rather than a 'modan' Prime Minister, given his strong identification 
with aaditionaJ Labour values. However this asse1tion raises many 
· sues bich are beyond the scope of this paper. 
While my own personal recollections are an important part of this 
paper, any one expecting a 'kiss and tell' tale will be disappointed. My 
objective is to attempt to bring together aspects of the theory and 
practice of political leadership. Certainly the opportunity to obse1ve 
politicalleadas at first hand provided a fascinating experience for a 
political scientist with a special interest in the issue of leadership. It is 
my view that the best training for a political scientist is to work for a 
while with politicians. I hope through this paper to share some of these 
experiences, and meet Barber's own call to make the study of politics 
more relevant and useful. 
Ce1tainly my experiences have confirmed the central lesson I learnt 
from Barber: that politics is a people business, and that the study of the 
actions and inactions of individuals and groups will explain much more 
about the political process than the traditional political science focus on 
structures. This assertion applies particularly to the understanding of a 
political party. Much of the history of the New Zealand Labour Party 
is centred around key personalities. 3 
The Barber 
Barber's typology is constructed from asking two simple questions 
relating to the President's level of activity (active or passive) and 
attitude towards this leadership activity (positive or negative). The 
activity dimension is readily recognisable by the amount of energy 
devoted to the job. The 'positive-negative' dimension can be more 
difficult to detect. Barber poses the question: 'Relatively speaking, does 
he seem to exp¢ence his political life as happy or sad, enjoyable or 
discouraging ... ' 4 Do the leaders have a positive or negative view of 
their politieallife? Are they happy in their work, or is it a burden that 
must be borne? 
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From these two dimensions emerge a 'general mapping scheme' with 
four character types: active-positive; active-negative; passive-positive; 
and passive-negative. Barber emphasises that the boundaries between 
these types are far from watertight. Politicians, like all of us, reflect 
differing degrees of activity in their chosen profession, and satisfaction 
with the amount of effort they put into their jobs. What Barber 
demonstrates is that these two dimensions which have their roots in the 
psychological literature, do help identify four distinct types of Presiden-
tial character. 
The character of a leader, which is forttlulated mainly in childhood 
experiences, helps answer the basic question: Why is the leader in 
politics? What drives them? The answer to this question for each of the 
Barber types is different. The 'active-negatives' are drawn by a need for 
power; the 'active-positives' by a desire to achieve certain policy goals; 
the 'passive-negatives' by a sense of duty; and the 'passive-positives' 
by a search for affection, gained principally through their ability to 
perforrn on the political stage. 
In analysing Labour's four most recent Prime Ministers, this paper 
argues that each reflects predominantly one of these types. (It was not 
the intention to find a representative of each type - it was the way it 
happened to turn out.) As with Barber's Presidents, there are no perfect 
'fits' and indeed some loose fits. Readers will be able to judge the 
degree to which they consider the categorisations to be accurate and 
helpful in understanding leadership behaviour. 
The focus of this paper is not so much on the character of the Prime 
Ministers, as the effect of personality on their style of operating. Barber 
defines style as 'a collection of habitual patterns of meeting role 
demands' .5 He identifies the three core role demands which confront 
leaders as: the need to speak to small and large groups and audiences 
(the rhetorical function); the need to deal with colleagues and other 
individuals (interpersonal relations); and the need to manage to cope 
with the organisation of government and party business, and the 
massive paper flow it generates (the management function). Barber 
demonstrates how different Presidents have concentrated on the style 
which seems to work best for then1. This tends to be the style they 
employed to gain their first independent political success. Not surpris-
ingly, politicians will tend to latch on to what seems to be a winning 
formula. 
Character analysis helps answer the question of l-vhy a leader is in 
politics. Deteriitining style will reveal how the leader operates political-
ly. But there is also a need to identify }Vhat they are in politics for in 
terms of their philosophy and ideals. This is what Barber refers to as 
the leader's 'world view'. It covers both the way the world is seen to 
mood'. 
• 
ra 
sort of they 
that needs to be asked after the 'why', 
have been conaidmut: · is 'to what 
do the public - the electorate, the party 
- aapirin1 or incumbent 's motivatioa, style 
? Barber attention on what he refers to as the public 
identifies three types of mood which seem, at least in 
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· o•ae of viewing politics as conflict, as a war between groups 
goals. 'Ibis is the dominant view of politics as 
poiblayed by the media. But the public will at times seek leadership 
which · take politics to a higher plane. This is the mood of 
COJ•science, of seeking spiritual uplift in contrast to the conflict of 
:utt••'··~ even corrupt, politicians. The third mood relates to the 
pu 's desire for a rest from the sttain of both conflict and appeals to 
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An attempt will now be made to assess the degree to which the four 
Labour Prime Ministers reflect one or more of these Barber character 
types and styles, their philosophies (or world views) and the relation-
ship of these three factors to the public mood. In conclu ion a brief 
assessment will be made of whether a change in party structures would 
assist the different types of leaders carry out their tasks. Finally the 
predictive dimension of the Barber approach will be applied to the 
political future of the leaders being considered in this paper. 
Rowling: Passive-Negative? 
As I have previously published my assessment of Rowling,6 I will 
restrict this analysis to a brief review of my main conclusions. I placed 
Rowling in the 'passive-negative' category, although the evidence was 
mixed. Cmtainly Rowling maintained a very high level of political 
activity, and earned the respect of his colleagues as a hard worker. For 
ex•rrq•Je. he travelled extensively throughout the coum•y in his largely 
..... effort to rebuild the Labour Party following its devastating 
197 ' . defeat. 
But the 'passive' nature of Rowling's character was evident in his at 
times detached view of his political tasks. He was not (as for instance 
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I will argue is Moore) totally consumed by politics. He did not seek the 
leadership position but accepted the decision of his caucus following 
the untimely death of Prime Minister Nor1nan Kirk in 1974. He 
preferred not to try and assert a dominating role. As he reflected: 'I am 
a quiet sort of man. I don't push myself in a group'. 7 He was in many 
ways a reluctant leader. 
For Rowling there was always more to life than politics. As early as 
1972 he talked about the possibility of retirement from politics. It was 
a job to which you gave your best, then went onto other pursuits: 'I 
believe that the pressures of the job are such that - if you're giving 
everything you've got - you must begin to bum out politically. Then 
rejuvenation is needed at the top'. 8 While he resisted the forces 
promoting David Lange to leadership (on the grounds that he con-
sidered Lange lacked the necessary experience), when Rawling was 
forced to step aside he did so without bitterness. 
Why are types like Rowling, who don't seek the leadership role, and 
carry it out with some reluctance, in politics? Barber considers that the 
key motivating force for the 'passive-negative' is a sense of duty. 9 This 
explains why they accept the leadership role they never sought. As 
Row ling explained, he took on the job of Prime Minister because 'I was 
wanted by my colleagues' .10 There are strengths as well as more 
obvious weaknesses in this type of leadership. As Barber explains: 
The orientation is toward perfouning duty with modesty; the political adaption 
is characterised by protective retreats to principle, ritual and personal virtue. 
The political strength of his character is his legitimacy. It inspires trust in the 
incorruptibility, and good intentions of the man. Its political weakness is its 
inability to produce, though it may contribute by preventing. 11 
These are the 'decent' leaders. Few would deny Rawling's consider-
able personal virtues. But, as is the fate of the 'passive-negative', this 
unassertive style tends to be perceived by large sections of the public 
as weakness. But the reality is that in tertns of Row ling's deter111ination 
to face up to problems, and directly confront colleagues who stepped 
out of line (such as Douglas and Moore), or friends who got themselves 
into political difficulties (such as Moyle), Rowling would rate as the 
toughest of the four Labour leaders considered in this paper. 
In terms of the three categories of leadership style outlined earlier, 
Row ling concentrated on management rather than the rhetorical or inter-
personal roles. He restored proper procedural arrangements to caucus 
and cabinet following the chaotic period of Kirk's dominating but 
erratic leadership. He emphasised a team approach. He also gave careful 
attention to his paperwork. But in the crucial area of rhetoric - of 
communicating directly to the electorate through television or cam-
a 
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between himself and a lot of other politicians was that they were 
'dependent on it (the job) for their careers and I never was ... I went in 
there to refortil the law and I did a lot of that. I never felt politics was 
a means in itself. I always thought it was a means to an end. It didn't 
reach me the way it reached a lot of people'. The Prime Ministership 
'was not a job I ever sought'. 24 
The attraction of politics as a means to achieve policy refottilS is 
typical of the 'active-positive' type. Their detachment from personal 
needs gives them the advantage of being as flexible as necessary to 
achieve policy goals. Consistent with the rational ideal of letting the 
evidence decide the required course of action, Palmer had no fitnl 
ideological beliefs, no rigid 'world view'. What concerned Palmer was 
the efficiency of the policy process. 
The best evidence that Palmer was not motivated by ideological 
beliefs was his admission that he initially sought nomination as a 
parliamentary candidate for National rather than Labour. His back-
ground as a constitutional lawyer, and his strong beliefs on individual 
rights, his privileged background (as the son of a newspaper editor), 
naturally led him to the National Party rather than the more collectivist 
goals of Labour. What turned him away from National was the 
vulgarity of Muldoon's leadership. Palmer was attracted by what he saw 
as the decency and propriety of Labour leader Bill Rawling. But for 
Muldoon, Palmer might well have been a National Prime Minister. 
In his maiden speech to Parliament, Palmer criticised the inadequacy 
of the existing decision-making structures. He asked the question: 
'What is democracy?', but gave his answer in tern1s of process, not end 
goals.25 Similarly his book on the New Zealand political system, 
Unbridled Power,26 focuses on the constitutional and machinery 
aspects of government, and is largely devoid of wider philosophical 
considerations. 
Palmer's support for constitutional reforn1s such as a Bill of Rights 
put him at odds with most of his colleagues. Palmer never understood 
the intensity of the Lange-Douglas dispute over economic policy. He 
always thought differences could be resolved by instituting new 
structures and processes. 
Problems arise for the 'active-positives' through their tendency to 
oversimplify, to assume that others are as 'rational' as they are, and 
overlook the less noble requirements of politics. As Barber has 
explained: 
The character who has overcome his own hang-ups, who has leaped over the 
barriers between himself and the real world, whose bent is towards rational 
mastery of the environment, is likely to forget, from time to time, that other 
persons, publics, and institutions, maintain themselves in messier ways. 
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Colin James noted Palmer's inability 'to see political need, 
naJCh less respond to it'. 28 The result was that Palmer failed to take 
advantage of the wave of goodwill which greeted his leadership. While 
he was good at handling detail, he did not succeed in putting a Palmer 
~ on his gOVCIIlJDeDt. 
Palmer's biggest political mistake was his attempt to bring both 
Roger Douglas and Richard Prebble back into the fold. Douglas had in 
effect resigned from I .ange's Cabinet, while Prebble had been dis-
missed. As Colin James wrote, in an assessment which bears a striking 
resemhlance to the Barber quote cited earlier: 
The righteous Palmer believes people should behave generously, rationally, and 
sensibly, and not, as most do, with self interest and ego foremost. Despite 
evidence to the contrary in his failure to bring Douglas and I .ange together, 
Palmer still believes compromises, tolerance of difference and pursuit of the 
gteater common goal are achievable with the right amount of earnest effort. 29 
Bill Rowling has sought to explain Palmer's apparent political naivety 
(although Rowling did not use the word) through reference to his 
· y effortless rise to prominence: 
Geoff's life was from school to university to university. Some of the other 
guys have gone through some fairly rough patches inside and outside of 
politics. They know what it's all about They know how to get the best 
advantage out of the system. I'm not sure Geoff was able to perceive that. 30 
Palmer's ter1n as Prime Minister lasted only 13 months. How much 
of the failure of the Palmer administration can be attributed to the 
Palmer style of operation? In Barber's terms, and consistent with the 
active-positive's 'rational' approach, Palmer put his emphasis on 
management, and to a lesser degree interpersonal relations. The area in 
which Palmer had least ability or success was in public presentation -
either in person or on TV. He came across as a rather detached and 
•wooden' law professor. Efforts by his media advisers to present him 
wir.h a more 1mman face' only added to the problems. 
Palmer prided himself as an efficient manager. He was very critical 
of what he saw as I .ange's limited interest and ability in management. 
He believed there was no problem which could not be resolved through 
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· thai he would · like to lead Labour again, but 
i would be a patty flee of the conflict that caused him to 
resign. 'I would love tO be leader of the Labour Party, and it would be 
good to be PM aga;n - if it was part of a team that had resolved its 
philosophy, and a capacity to work together, and was not pursuing 
-aendas with which I disagree' .53 This description does not sound like 
the New Zealand Labour Party. Any call for I .ange to resume a 
leadership role would be likely to come from a wide groundswell of 
opiDion extending well beyond the party. 
Moore recognises that he is still on probation as leader. He promises 
a cautious approach: 'I want to go very carefully right through to 
election day, talldng people's expectations down. People expect certain 
things. Whenever a government goes above exFtations it means you 
have a fo11nula for a sustained government'. The strategy appears 
sound. The problem is that it is counter to the Moore activist political 
style. The danger for the active-negative type is that their compulsive 
tendencies may cause them to latch on to a self-defeating course of 
action. Their need for power can make them dogmatic and unwilling to 
listen or consider the views of others. 
Moore has the potential to be another Nor1118n Kirk - a Labour 
leader whom I have also categorised active-negative. He has the 
potential for considerable populist appeal, and an ability to relate to the 
so-called ordinary New Zealanders in a way similar to both Kirk and 
Muldoon. 
Barber has written about the 'resonance' between individual style and 
the wider public 'climate of expectations'. If the public are looking for 
a strong populist leader to take New Zealand out of its many diffi-
culties, Moore c_ould emerge as one of New Zealand's dominating 
leaders - in the mould of Kirk or Seddon. But if there is a yearning for 
a return to quieter times, and an end to radical change and political 
warfare and the re-establishment of a society based on the values of 
caring and compassion that gave rise to the welfare state, there could 
well be a turning back to I .ange. 
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This eiior is, ironically, a product of current ideological struggle. 
Mannheim points out that 
For most people, the te11n 'ideology' is closely bound up with Marxism, and 
their reactions to the te11n are largely deteiinined by the association. It is 
therefore first necessary to state that although Marxism contributed a great deal 
to the original statement of the problem, both the word and its meaning go 
further back in history than Marxism and ever since its time new meanings of 
the word have emerged, which have taken shape independently of it.2 
In other words, 'ideology' is a general political fighting word and if 
it is to be used for the analysis of the imperatives of political 
organisation then a deliberate effort must be made to persuade 
interlocutors to suspend their natural belligerence. I do not dispute the 
proposition that nature red in tooth and claw has an honourable place 
in any assembly of the social sciences. I suggest merely that you hear 
me out in this examination of the various applications of the word 
'ideological' before you tum and rend me. 
There is a paradox to be dealt with. As one authority points out the 
terttt has variously signified a 'politico-social program' on the one 
hand, to the much more complex 'organization of opinions, attitudes 
and values- a way of thinking about man and society' on the other.3 
Humpty Dumpty, you may recall, famously told Alice that a 'word 
means what I choose it to mean' and I intend to follow this convenient 
device while admitting that I have no more warrant to do so than those 
who converted 'marxism' into an anti-marxist missile. It will be up to 
you to decide whether this procedure has been heuristically justified 
when I have made my pitch. This implies of course that I will offer you 
no proposition that is complete and unassailable but rather typological 
hypotheses that may explain some of the possible ideological options 
open to the Labour Party if the members are impelled to act in a way 
that will tend towards the survival rather than the extinction of the 
Party. One cannot be assured of this after the events of late '87 and 
early '88 of course. 
As someone pointed out, ideology has always trailed a pejorative 
connotation rather like the similar disapproving label 'doctrinaire'. We 
can get closer to the difficulty that an ideological position generates by 
considering what effects ideology is thought to have on those subject 
to its influence. For example, in a very recent issue of the Listener a 
profile on an Anglican cleric includes an indirect description of the 
government as ' ... blinded by its belief in individualism, the market and 
the rest of it'. This is described directly as 'institutional capture'. In the 
context it is reasonable to assume that some ministers are thought to be 
captives of the Treasury and have in their tum captured their colleagues 
around the cabinet table. An analytical game evolves, carried on by 
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a coaference. I programme throws light on 
a perennial preoccupation of the political left. The conference aimed to 
... promote the \Jetter o!pllisation of the classes; to carefully consider 
all affecting their interests ... [which] better their conditions; to take 
all steps possible for passing into law such measures ... to use every legitimate 
means to obtain a proper representation of Labour in the Legislature ... 5 
While it could be an exaggeration to suggest that employers 
welcomed bade unions, it is true that so long as they made such 
deferential and modest political claims as these there was no need to 
fear them. This moderation, encouraged by depression, persisted in the 
trades and labour councils which were in constant dispute with the 
militant, so-called industrial unions. The conflict in the labour move-
ment remains unresolved, although it is undoubtedly obscured by the 
theoretical apostasy of Rogemomics. 
The political incumbents did not exactly welcome working class 
competitors in the struggle for place and prefer1nent, but while they 
promoted ideas in line with the refor1nist radicalism of the Liberal 
ascendancy a function could be found for a modest group of 'labour' 
members. The Lib-Labs went on to political glory in the pursuit of 
what they complacently accepted as 'state socialism', yet they remained 
paradoxically a middle-class party of property. Although one of the 
most active members of the government was the only prominent 
politician in our history who could be called a political theorist, the 
policies were designed to secure the support of particular groups and 
were not dictated by any larger intellectual idea than the freedom 
conferred by sustained prosperity. In one sense this has been an 
enduring advantage to all subsequent administrations - including 
Labour- seeking to justify state interventions. In another, the Lib-Labs 
were a foritridable obstacle to the development of a moderate social 
democratic party. In the result, the cause of labour was carried forward 
by militant socialists who found their support in the unions of the vastly 
expanded transport and construction sectors. Their enemies were as 
much the leaders of the state regulated craft unions as they were the 
capitalists. The strike was a political weapon against oppressive class 
enemies mobilised by governments. The bourgeois capitalist state was, 
as Marx had it, a committee of the ruling class. A letter dated 13 March 
1912 from the Secretary of the Socialist Party of New Zealand - an 
office once held by one M. J. Savage - outlines the objects and 
methods of the militants: ' ... the organisation of the workers of New 
Zealand. Propaganda methods - soapbox speaking, lectures, selling and 
distribution of literature; discussions etc. Object - the socialisation of 
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given way to the Council of Trade Unions. The Irishman, one James 
Roberts, remarked about the Labour Party: 'After twenty years 
experience the piffle their platfortn contained was enough to make any 
intelligent man or woman blush. We want a revolutionary party .. .if we 
have elected our rats to Parliament it is a good means of getting them 
out of the way' .8 
I can confittll from a useful private source that the same James 
Roberts, despite a brief stint in the Legislative Council, never really 
altered his opinion of parliamentary ideologues. They were there to 
subvert the system until the way could be cleared for 'industrial 
democracy' which meant, in effect, the economic governance of the 
workers through the trade union mechanism. For all the persistence of 
his theoretical convictions, James Roberts was to become the longest 
serving President of the Labour Party. His was and remains the 
dilemma of the ideologically-instructed faced by the realities of winning 
and retaining political power. In an address to the annual meeting of the 
Alliance of Labour he remarked that 'It is popular to boost up 
organisations that talk of strike and use high falutin militant tern1s 
which mean very little to those who have experience of adjusting 
disputes' .. 9 He was not the first and certainly not the last leader of trade 
union federations who found a conflict between ideological conditions 
and a developed awareness of what the real power balance allowed. 
By 1921, four years after the socialist revolution in Russia, Peter 
Fraser who would once have regarded himself as a revolutionary 
socialist asserted to the Annual Party Conference that 'The Labour 
Party stands against methods of force and violence for the achievement 
of its objects'. As a result of this the idea of working class ascendancy 
was transmuted into a ' ... struggle for political supremacy'. 10 
What remained of socialism in a theoretical sense is exemplified by 
the proposal to create a system of land tenure based upon the produc-
tive effort of the landholder. 'Usehold' as it was called depended upon 
the gradual nationalisation of the land, the provision of resources 
through a state bank and the protection of the smallholder and the 
farmer in difficulties in the post war slump. This sounds impossibly 
interventionist to_ a modern ear but in 1921 it represented a not 
unreasonable enlargement of a familiar process. Government was, after 
all, the prime holder of land and had operated a public finance agency 
to promote land settlement. Again, though it seems absurd today, there 
were many small-holders who shared Labour's view that the hard 
working proprietor of a family farm should be the object of the 
government's tender concern. 
From this time on there begins, in my opinion, a long slow ideologi-
cal retreat by Labour from the socialist positions that had been so 
painfully devised and sustained in the first two decades of the century. 
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The historical accounts show how the gathering exigencies of economic 
decline turned the Labour Party towards expediencies designed to 
relieve the consequences of unemployment and retrenchment in social 
services. James Roberts saw the point very clearly in 1934: 
... although the workers today are suffering from the effects of a man made 
depression, the results will in the end benefit the working class as a whole, for, 
to put it bluntly, the depression has been the greatest lesson learned by the 
capitalist class for the past century. Delegates will remember that from 1928 
to 1931 there was a general demand for wage cuts and for the worsening of 
conditions of employment throughout the Dominion. Added to this demand, 
propaganda on the part of the employers suggesting that the protection given 
to the workers by law should be removed, in short, that every avenue open to 
the workers by which they could organise to sell their only commodity -
labour power - to the best advantage should be closed to them. 11 
Now this seems to me a very significant passage because it contains 
the seeds of so much conventional thinking by Labour as to how they 
could benefit their clientele, sustain economic activity by the expansion 
of public programmes, and, above all, so discredit the capitalist party 
with charges of meanness and stupidity that they would be swept off 
the political board, at least until the bill for funding a government-led 
recovery was presented. 
This rough hewn Keynesianism uncovers two important aspects of 
Labour's learning curve. In the first place, it became dogma that the 
'purchasing power' of the people must be sustained at all costs. Thus 
the enduring damage to the conservative reputation by the decision to 
impose cuts in government salaries and to give the Arbitration Court 
the task of reducing award rates across the board. Once done in one 
direction such a tactic could be and was employed to increase wages. 
The other point was that there was never an intellectual wing to the 
socialist movement. The men who made the doctrine were, in general, 
from the bottom of society. They were autodidacts who acquired their 
theory in the few spare moments of a life of hard labour, agitation, 
organisation, intertninable meetings and public debate. There is nothing 
at all akin to the Fabian Society in New Zealand, no tradition of lively 
progressive journalism, a largely inert mass in the institutions of higher 
learning. Debate on the left alternative outside the publications of the 
working class movement was largely incoherent and not infrequently 
venal, dishonest abuse. Labour had good reason to believe that the 
Party would never get a square deal from the daily press. It is unfor-
giveable but equally unsurprising that when they were able to get their 
hands on a mass communications agency they used it mercilessly to 
promote their interests. The New Zealand Broadcasting Service is a 
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The one exception was of course Roger Douglas, who had been one 
of the very few rising stars in the Kirk and Row ling administrations and 
had seen the looming economic crisis of an economy conditioned to 
look to the government for favours in return for confortnity to 
economic strategies. Whether or not Rogemomics is an ideology or not 
may be debated. What is incontestable is that what might be called the 
consensual economic polity has been subject to a flood of criticism. 
In what may well be the best conceptual account of the problem, 
Mancur Olson pointed to the inevitable tendency of pressure groups to 
maximise their own interests at the cost of the collectivity and, as a 
result, cripple the capacity of the economy to adapt. 12 It is true that the 
New Zealand consensual system had been more extensive and probably 
more collegial than most of the other variants on the Keynesian theme. 
It was, in effect, the substitute for the regime dictated by a socialist 
ideology but it had and has no theoretical underpinning in its own right. 
I will return to this point in a minute. Yet, among political value 
systems it retains a nostalgic appeal. It is associated with egalitarianism, 
with the benevolence of full employment, with the moral superiority of 
a universal benefit structure for all those who have fallen on adversity. 
Certainly, many of those who were nurtured in the consensus culture 
do not concede that the economic crisis of the mid-1980s was provoked 
by the rising costs, inefficiency and inequity of public enterprise and 
income transfers. 
But the problem for this band of true believers in what they would 
call a decent society is that the dominant spirit of the times is 
overwhelmingly against them in practice and principle. The overwhelm-
ing intellectual consensus is that interventionist societies misallocate 
resources and drive economies into debt and inflation. These, in tum, 
work powerfully to increase poverty and reduce economic vitality. 
Practices allegedly based on Marxist theory have certainly failed to 
attract the support of people in the fo1n1er Warsaw Pact countries. One 
can, of course, argue that all this is due to a misinterpretation of the 
facts but, in electoral te1 n1s, to put forward an orthodox social 
democratic programme would simply court total defeat. Are there still 
areas of social need that can only be met by deliberate application of 
political power derived from humanitarian principle and credible 
analysis of social process? Anthony Crosland, a leading Labour 
politician and theorist, lists six of these priorities. They reflect specific 
British preoccupations but Crosland's priorities in methodology are 
suggestive of a wider principle: 
Firstly we must decide that greater equality, and not spawning new pieces 
of State bureaucracy, is what fundamentally divides us from the Tories. 
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may be a general condition is suggested by recent data gathered in 
connection with a comparative study of political parties and confidence 
in government in the United States, Norway and Sweden. In the latter 
two countries, the authors suggest 'What may have started out as a 
decline in specific support in these countries eventually came to 
influence diffuse support and that institutional arrangements of the 
political regimes' .15 
It seems to me beyond contest that the inability of the current major 
parties to establish a policy line and hew to it has not only debilitated 
the parties but also faith in the political system. This is disturbing. 
While it is true that the political structure survived for nearly 40 years 
without any discernible devotion to - or even discussion of- ideologi-
cal principles, it is also true that there was almost no substantial conflict 
upon basic principles between the major parties. This is no longer likely 
to be the case. The leader of the Labour Party announced the end of 
'Rogemomics' after the 1991 Annual Conference. It is not clear what 
is to take its place, but the whole temper of the times suggests to me 
that there will be a return to sharp conflict upon principle rather than 
the crude name calling of the past. Labour, against all the odds a year 
ago, has a chance of winning in 1993 but will have to rebuild the active 
party membership. Up to now there has been a supply of ambitious 
progressives whose dislike of the National Party has compensated for 
the vacuum in Labour's philosophy. This is unlikely to be sufficient 
now. What ideology is likely to attract competent support and consoli-
date the Party's challenge to National? 
To my mind this must be based upon the idea of empowering the 
citizens to take a greater part in the evolution and scrutiny of policies. 
This is the keystone of the other great object, the promotion of equality. 
Equality naturally comprehends the principle of equitable access to 
social services and education. Labour must also acknowledge the need 
for greater political diversity and prepare itself to work constructively 
in coalition with other political groups. As a fundamental principle, 
echoing but refining the claims of the past, Labour should accept that 
the resources of the society must be managed whether in public or 
private control, in accordance with principles of environmental 
sustainability. 
My answer to the question 'Is there an ideology that could bind the 
loyalty of able and energetic members and provide them with construc-
tive tasks in or out of office?' is an emphatic 'yes'. All it takes is a 
deep breath and a little understanding of the influence of the past on the 
present. 
But this leads us to a major problem. The Party has no longer the 
option of returning to the managed economy they had bequeathed to 
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them by the National Party in 1949. Globalisation is a reality we cannot 
wish away. 
The ideological problem is to create a belief that it is not impossible 
to respond in a creative humanitarian manner to the needs of individ-
uals or sectors in adversity (and not only in economic teriils) without 
regenerating that distrust and dislike of the beneficiaries. 
Labour's greatest ideological achievement was to persuade society 
that virtue resided in ensuring a place of respect for everyone: what we 
called 'full employment'. 
The open economy makes the distortion of economic processes 
which supported full employment (tariffs and public ownership) 
impossible. Thus the problem will be to find other valid ways to assert 
the dignity, place and purpose of the individual as a social actor: in 
other words, to reject the notion that homo economicus is the sole focus 
of public concern. 
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